

What Crisis in Onomastics?¹

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In a recent article in this journal,² T.L. Markey conjures up what he calls a “crisis in cognition on the part of onomastics” (pp. 130, 142), an assertion which is in need of some response, despite his final reassurance that “the anxiety is unnecessary” (p. 142). Although his arguments are fuzzy in their eclecticism, his motivations mixed in origin and intent, and his central corpus of evidence is only vaguely relevant to the topic, in the problems it addresses,³ it appears that his so-called “crisis” has been caused by several separate, though interlinked, factors: (1) The general, limited handmaiden role of onomastics – its “conceivable relevancy,” in Markey’s terms – in the world of intellectual inquiry (p. 129); (2) in particular, its peripherality “to the mainstream of general linguistics” (p. 129); (3) its lack of growth, regarding the numbers of “practitioners” in the discipline (p. 130); (4) its organizational isolation, nationally as well as internationally (p. 130); (5) its low standards, or what Markey is pleased to call “the low price of admission to the arena of onomastic inquiry” (p. 131); (6) its “mere recognition of etymological detail” (p. 131) and sometimes even “mere scientific recitation of anecdotes” (p. 131) leading, especially in North America “to trivializing about isolates” (p. 134); and (7) a retreat “in droves to literary onomastics” which Markey regards as an “even more . . . futile exercise” than the “analysis of isolates” because it is not apparent to him “what, if anything, meaningful could be said about the construction of language on the basis of the study of the personal and place names in the works of Charles Dickens” (p. 134).

Let me comment on these seven points in turn, without adopting a posture of defensiveness and without creating the feeling that name scholars have finally been cornered and somehow found out after years, or even decades, of disciplinary myopia which has prevented them from seeing the field of onomastics and its practitioners in their true light. In fact, I have been somewhat hesitant to offer a public reply to Markey’s assertions, just in case the very attempt at refutation appears to imply, however subtly, that there may be a minimal amount of truth to at least some of his allegations. It is incredulity I am trying to portray, not

credence. It then occurred to me, however, that leaving them unanswered might allow the same inference with even greater force and might indeed produce a crisis by somehow admitting the potential reality of an unfortunate illusion. So, here it goes, with reluctance which should, however, not be construed as lack of conviction.

Markey's opening statement, i.e. the very first sentence of his article, claims without qualification or explanation that "as the investigation of names and naming (in the broadest sense of these terms), onomastics is conceivably relevant to at least three sectors of inquiry: formal linguistics, the philosophy of language, and ethnography" (p. 129). What is disturbing about this statement is not so much the limited, though not exclusive, selection of three contiguous areas of scholarship, all fundamentally concerned with inquiry into the nature and function of language (he defines ethnography, for example, somewhat narrowly and arbitrarily "as language in society, linguistic history, and literary studies, as well as in anthropology, settlement history, and other forms of linguistic archeology" [p. 129]), but the basic notion that the study of names and naming apparently derives its very existence, its intellectual stimulation and its directed thoughtfulness not so much from within, from intradisciplinary concerns, as from without, from its relevance and usefulness to the formal linguist, the philosopher of language, the ethnographer and others like them, although it is not clear from the essay how this nuclear triad might be expanded. What we are told is that onomastics may conceivably serve the ends of such scholars and their disciplines while the possibility is not even considered in passing that formal linguistics, philosophy of language, ethnography and other disciplines of that ilk may conceivably aid the study of names and naming. This blinkered denial willfully and capriciously ignores the several efforts – some more successful than others – which have been made in the last few decades – in the classroom, at conferences and in print – to recognize, describe, analyze and interpret the process of naming and the product of that process, names, independent of the demands and attitudes of extra-onomastic or non-onomastic scholarship, and to redefine the relationship of the study of names and naming to other kinds of scholarship on the basis of a newly found self-understanding of onomastics as a sector of inquiry in its own right.

What emerges from such an approach is, in the context of modern thinking, not only an emancipated, mature "discipline" with its own corpus of evidence, its own traffic rules, its own intellectual strategies, its own body of literature, and its own specialists; not only either a new view of the inter-disciplinary or cross-disciplinary role which onomastics plays in endeavors particular to *homo ludens academicus*; not only, therefore,

its particular locus in the mosaic which is our mental construct of the world; but rather an accumulation of emphases which, because of their central preoccupation with the age-old and ever-present human dilemma of self and other, of identity and opposite, is almost frightening, in its modernity, through its very negation of disciplinary boundaries and its espousing of a world not of interlocking but of criss-crossing, overlapping, potentially always congruent and confluent systems, an array of blendings and blurrings, teasings, rejections and concurrences. Thus, onomastics, in an old-fashioned sense, is indeed a sub-discipline of linguistics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, geography, folklore, archeology, theology, and so on, but linguistics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, geography, folklore, archaeology, theology, and son on are also sub-disciplines of onomastics, if a mode of thinking which insists on genres, categories and disciplines has any place here at all. So much for the “conceivable relevance” of the study of names and naming to other “sectors of inquiry.”

As a result of this view of things, one could dismiss as, to all intents and purposes, irrelevant the chiding accusation that onomastics is “quite peripheral to the mainstream of general linguistics” (p. 129). Since this argument is, however, indispensable to the invented sense of crisis, it deserves some attention. What makes it so difficult to deal with is the uncritical assumption of the existence of such a “mainstream” in linguistic inquiry since, let us say, the Second World War. Undoubtedly, there have been major dominating approaches – structural, generative, transformational, stratificational, etc. – to the study of language and languages which have given us new insights and new perspectives, but any claims as to the universal applicability of their findings, once hailed with great confidence, have become, over the years, much less widely accepted and more confined in their relevance. If we know what the transformational rules are by which one language generates its sentences we are still far from knowing how the human mind works.

Even if we accept, however, that these several dominating approaches form a kind of “mainstream” in linguistic scholarship, it is by no means true that such approaches have been ignored by name scholars or that linguists following them have not applied them to names. Exactly twenty years ago, Francis Lee Utley encouraged greater attention to “The Linguistic Component of Onomastics.”⁴ Two years later (1965), Odo Leys’ influential essay on “The Name as a Linguistic Sign” appeared,⁵ and in 1968 Witold Mańczak explored the relationship between “Onomastics and Structuralism.”⁶ In 1971, Aimo Seppänen published a substantial article on “Proper names in a transformational grammar of English.”⁷ In

the same year, Willy Van Langendonck made available a summary of his thesis on “The Theory of Proper Names” in which he, too, employed a transformational approach, examining names primarily in connection with deixis and quantification in the nominal phrase.⁸ He later enlarged on these ideas in a paper on “The Semantic Syntax of Proper Names” (1973)⁹ and in reviews of John Algeo’s *On Defining the Proper Name* and Rainer Wimmer’s *Der Eigennamen im Deutschen* (1974 and 1975).¹⁰ In 1972–73, the Czech name scholar Rudolf Šrámek discussed extensively the notions of “model” and “system” in the study of place names,¹¹ an investigation which he followed with an examination of theoretical problems in onomastics in linguistic contact situations.¹² Bengt Pamp, the Swedish linguist, in a fine study borrowed, as he put it, “a few elementary concepts from generative grammar” and Chomsky’s “mentalistic approach” and applied them to the study of names.¹³ Elsewhere, John Searle in his investigation of speech acts paid particular attention to “the problem of proper names” and to the “speech act of identifying reference,”¹⁴ while, more recently Hartwig Kalverkämper offered an extensive *Textlinguistik der Eigennamen*,¹⁵ derived from his earlier dissertation on *Eigennamen und Kontext*.¹⁶ Nearer at hand, Canada’s André Lapierre’s work has demonstrated the profound interest some “mainstream linguists” have in the study of names.¹⁷ These are just a few prominent examples but they are enough swallows to make a summer, and while it is perhaps too audacious to claim that they show names to be of central concern to general linguists, they certainly remove them from the periphery of linguistic inquiry somewhat closer to its center.

Anyone wishing to trace and understand the impact which onomastics and linguistics have had on each other – their mutual relevancy, so to speak – has to be aware, in the first place, however, of the host of studies (including Pulgram’s and Algeo’s classics)¹⁸ which have examined from a multitude of angles and a plethora of attitudes the relationship between appellative and proper name or, as I prefer to call them, between word and name.¹⁹ Though phonological, morphological and syntactic criteria have played important parts in many of these studies, the main emphasis has been on the semantic properties involved, concentrating, in many instances, on the question of how far it is necessary or possible for names to have lexical meaning. The semantics of names vs. the semantics of words has been the most attractive and active field of inquiry in onomastics,²⁰ investigating a large cultural variety of names and their embeddedness in many different languages. It is not surprising therefore that the onomastician’s closest ally is the lexicologist; the student of names is most easily understood by the student of words. Consequently, Markey’s observation

that the number of practitioners in the area of onomastics has not grown while the number of scholars interested in linguistics has swelled considerably over the years (p. 130) has to be put in its proper perspective. Statistics only work when appropriately employed. Although I have no figures available, I am certain that, while the recent intensive interest in syntax and discourse has produced a notable, almost dramatic, upsurge in the interest in linguistics, there has been no equivalent growth in the number of those whose primary concern is the word, not the sentence. It is therefore quite erroneous to interpret the lack of numbers in the ranks of name scholars as a sign of stagnation or backwater conservatism, especially since it is quite absurd to think of name scholars only in terms of linguists who also have, for one reason or another, an interest in names.

Such oblique vision also falsifies the perception of what Markey sees as organizational isolation. Nationally, the American Name Society did not grow out of the Linguistic Society of America but out of the American Dialect Society, and the overlap in membership between these two societies, the ANS and the ADS, is still great. This is a natural alliance which has its major area of contact in a shared interest in lexical items and their spatial and register distribution. Far from eccentric, sterile isolation, there is fruitful co-operation here and mutual respect. Dialecticians do indeed know "what onomastics is about," even if many linguists, according to Markey, do not (p. 130). It is just as falsifying to read a "schism" into the fact that the International Congress of Onomastic Sciences (ICOS) is not part of the Permanent International Committee of Linguists (CIPL/PICL). The study of names is, after all, so much more than just the study of their linguistic properties or embeddedness, and an exclusive alliance with linguists on the international level would put undesirable restrictions on the potential investigations which name scholars might wish to conduct. Contrary to Markey's opinion, "those dealing with names" are not "perplexed that, somehow, names and naming are not part of linguistics" (p. 130), and without such perplexity there cannot be, or at least should not be, any "crisis in cognition." Name scholars do not feel hurt, persecuted or misunderstood because ICOS (which, by the way, here stands for International *Committee* on Onomastic Sciences, and not for International *Congress*!) has been "excluded" (Markey's loaded term) from PICL. They do not even know whether it would be appropriate to be "included." The Canadian Society for the Study of Names has, for example, just recently found its proper home in the Canadian Federation for the Humanities, and it is significant that a journal like *Mind*, with its special interest in psychology and philosophy, has, over the years, shown a keen interest in the study of names.

Markey's fifth reason for the crisis he perceives is "the low price of admission to the arena of onomastic inquiry" (p. 131). Insofar as this argument has any validity, those responsibly concerned with the study of names as an important contribution to knowledge and involved in its organizational institutionalization and its publications have, of course, for quite some time tried to raise the general level of scholarship in the field and to make practitioners aware of modern expectations and standards. The leaders of both the ANS and the CSSN have in recent years taken a forceful role in such endeavors. That improvement is desirable, indeed essential, is beyond dispute. It is, however, equally self-evident that onomastics is not the only field of inquiry in which such improvement is to be sought, indeed fought for, and it is certainly unfair to compare the best and most professional in modern linguistics with the worst and most amateurish in modern onomastics. It is symptomatic in this respect that Markey does not quote a single name scholar practicing in North America, apart from himself,²¹ thus implying a general absence of rigor, training, standards, and so on. Whether stemming from ignorance or deliberate disdain and silence on the matter – and I think it must be the latter – such skewed referencing proves absolutely nothing, one way or the other, and quixotically helps him to build windmills to his own design at which he can then go tilting to his heart's content. The relationship between well-trained professionals and enthusiastic amateurs is never easy in any field of inquiry and has to be confronted and dealt with by those most directly and knowledgeably involved. To insinuate lack of awareness of the problem on the part of the professionals or, even worse, to hint at the total absence of such discriminating professionals is irresponsible distortion of the facts and transcends mere quixoticism. Perhaps, it is first of all necessary to understand what and where "the arena of onomastic inquiry" is before one starts haggling about its "price of admission." There is room for many different talents, many different minds, many different kinds of expertise and skills in name studies.

Similar misinformation – indeed, an almost pathetic refusal to be informed – underlies Markey's insistence that name scholars, especially in North America, are satisfied with the "mere recognition of etymological detail," "mere scientific recital of anecdotes," and the "trivializing about isolates" (p. 131). Of course, there will always be those whose main interest will lie primarily and legitimately in the etymologizing of names but it is probably true to say that name scholars in North America have been among the most emphatic in their demands that the reduction of names to the words they once were is not enough, that it is inappropriate in many instances and that names often function very well as names without

word meaning, and that even when lexical meaning is accessible it does not usually interfere with name contents. Etymology is not the be all and end all of onomastic research, and if the “mere recognition of etymological detail” is an index to Markey’s “low price of admission” he does not know where the “arena” is. To claim in addition that North American scholars focus on “isolates” is even less responsible. How can anybody who wishes to make an objective assessment of the situation ignore Janet Gritzner’s study of hierarchical onomastic taxonomies on the Eastern Shore,²² Celia Millward’s sophisticated discovery, through patterns of binary contrast, of certain universals in place-name generics in Rhode Island,²³ Wilbur Zelinsky’s eye-opening investigation of classical town names and their reflection of the rise and diffusion of an American idea,²⁴ Meredith Burrill’s and Donald Orth’s illuminating studies of names and the landscape,²⁵ or my own examination of name clusters, “onomastic fields” and “onomastic dialects,”²⁶ to mention just a few examples of studies whose main intention is the elucidation of relationships among names and their structural and systemic interdependence? It is equally wrongheaded to regard the collection and publication of stories about names in all instances as “trivialization.” Names create stories, stories create names, stories change names and interfere with expected linguistic, especially phonological and morphological, behavior. Stories are important adjuncts to onomastic processes and, whether trivial in themselves or not, are therefore legitimate evidence for both the student of folk-narrative and the student of names.²⁷ To dismiss them outright as of no consequence means to discard valuable additional material without which, in certain cases, neither the meaning nor the function of the name in question can be fully understood.

Markey’s last argument is probably the most invidious and most ill-informed of all. It goes like this:

Deprived of an amenable laboratory, American onomasticians also abandoned the established tools of a venerable trade. They retreated in droves to literary onomastics. But if the analysis of isolates, such as the Moscovs of the land, is an exercise in futility when deprived of continuity, then literary onomastics is even more of a futile exercise. There can be no continuity to literary onomastics, and no meaningful history that appeals to implication. Even less than literature itself, literary onomastics is no branch of linguistics. . . . It is not apparent to me, at least, what, if anything, meaningful could be said about the construction of language on the basis of a study of personal and place names in the works of Charles Dickens (p. 134).

As it would take a whole paper in itself to locate and replace the several extraordinarily misplaced stepping-stones in this sequence of bold statements, let me just say one or two things as the study of names in literature

is by now a mature enough enterprise for both students of names and students of literature to take care of itself. (1) Far from being without a laboratory, North American name scholars have much greater opportunities than their colleagues in countries with extensive cultural depth and continuity to study such processes as name giving, name acquisition, name usage and name competence, and to make their findings available to scholars studying, let us say, medieval or dark age names and naming elsewhere. (2) Having on their own doorstep an extremely amenable onomastic laboratory, they have consequently not been deprived and have not seen any necessity for abandonment and retreat. A quick glance at the names of those who have contributed most strongly, in the last decade, to the growth of literary onomastics, reveals, on the one hand, students of literature for whom the elucidation of the function of names in literary works has become an integral part of their craft, and, on the other, name scholars who have pursued the study of names in literature in addition to, not in place of, their other onomastic interests. Sometimes both interests are combined in the same person. Literary onomastics is therefore anything but an easy and illegitimate substitute for something more authentic or more worthwhile. (3) Literary onomastics has never claimed to say “something meaningful about the construction of language,” or “to uncover processual universals” in the science called linguistics. If it is no branch of linguistics, so be it; it is certainly a branch simultaneously of both onomastics and literature or, as Leonard Ashley, recognizing the unattainability of “scientific literary onomastics,” has put it, using George Jean Nathan’s phrase, “to hell with the ideal of impersonal criticism.”²⁸

So much for the seven explicit or implicit arguments in Markey’s analysis of where onomastics, and especially North American onomastics, is supposed to be today. At the end of his article, the author does a remarkable and quite unexpected *volte face*. The windmills of the mind have been demolished and Don Quixote is now on the side of the angels. After a highly condensed and in its exposition quite inadequate discussion of names in terms of “developmental linguistics” (p. 141), he tells us what name scholars have known for a long time:

The notions of onomastics are by and large of a different order than those of linguistics, but their distinction does not make them any less valued. Names represent a repository of language data that is highly relevant by virtue of the inferences those data permit about etymology, settlement history, social structure, cultural attitudes, and intertextual symbolic values. (pp. 141–142)

We are told that the anxiety caused by the crisis in cognition in onomastics is really quite unnecessary, as long as onomastics persists

“with the standards of its venerable past.” This venerable past or golden age of onomastics is said to be that of the concerns and pursuits of historical linguistics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the value of place names in the investigation of settlement history was first recognized and their study undertaken with “New Philological” rigor. As someone who has used toponyms extensively for that very purpose, I agree with this assessment that names are excellent evidence for this kind of study and that we must continue to use them toward these ends with ever-increasing sophistication. It would, however, be far wrong for name scholars to limit the study of names and naming to this particular exploration and exploitation, and to have it relegated to handmaiden status again. If we have learned anything from our intensive involvement with names in recent years, it is that onomastics, though not without boundaries, has by no means exhausted its full potential.

“Serious linguists may have been discouraged by the non-linguistic components of onomastics,” as Utley pointed out two decades ago;²⁹ name scholars, however, see these same components as an encouraging enrichment of the diversity of their intellectual activities. In the end, only the onomastician has the right to say where the limits of onomastics lie and what its standards are to be. The study of names and naming is not only a science but also an art, and while undoubtedly there has to be scientific rigor, there also has to be sensitivity, a sense of aesthetics and an understanding of the human psyche. If there is a crisis in onomastics today it is not caused by its being divorced from, or neglected by, general linguistics or by organizational discontent, but rather by much more fortunate circumstances, namely the pleasant dilemma of having to decide how to contain, channel and harness its cognitive and creative potential. I am sure that this is a task which onomasticians will gladly undertake and that, for reasons very different from the ones advanced by Tom Markey, there is no need for anxiety. General linguists, too, can rest assured that, when they recognize the value and importance of the word again for the study of linguistics, name scholars will be ready for them, having marshaled, analyzed and interpreted a large corpus of onomastic evidence.³⁰

Here ends the Flyting.

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Notes

¹This is a revised version of a paper first read at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for the Study of Names in Vancouver, B.C., June 2–4, 1983.

²T.L. Markey, "Crisis and Cognition in Onomastics," *Names*, 30 (1982), 129–142. Quotations from this article will be indicated by page numbers in the text.

³His major discussion concerns the "tendency" that "an indigenous population regularly gives up its personal names (and personal naming system) in favor of those introduced by newcomers, while newcomers regularly adopt indigenous place names, but not indigenous personal names" (p. 135).

⁴Francis Lee Utley, "The Linguistic Component of Onomastics," *Names*, 11 (1963), 145–176.

⁵Odo Leys, "De eigenaam als linguistisch teken," *Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Naamkunde to Leuven en de Commissie voor Naamkunde te Amsterdam*, 41 (1965), 1–81.

⁶Witold Mańczak, "Onomastik und Strukturalismus," *Beiträge zur Namenforschung N.F.*, 3 (1968), 52–60. See also Ernst Eichler, "Strukturelle Versuche in der Onomastik," *Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philologica*, 1–3 (1966), 151–162.

⁷Aimo Seppänen, "Proper names in a transformational grammar of English," *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen*, 72 / 2 (1971), 304–338.

⁸Willy Van Langendonck, "Über die Theorie des Eigennamens," *Onoma*, 16, 1–2 (1971), 87–91.

⁹Willy Van Langendonck, "Zur semantischen Syntax der Eigennamen," *Namenkundliche Informationen*, 23 (1973), 14–24.

¹⁰W. Van Langendonck, "Über das Wesen des Eigennamens: Zu zwei nicht-generativen Theorien des Eigennamens," *Onoma*, 18, 3 (1974), 337–361; and review of J. Algeo, *On Defining the Proper Name*, *Foundations of Language*, 13 (1975), 603–606.

¹¹R. Šrámek, "Zum Begriff 'Modell' und 'System' in der Toponomastik," *Onoma*, 17 (1972–3), 55–75.

¹²R. Šrámek, "Zu den theoretischen Problemen der Namenforschung im Sprachkontakt," *Onoma*, 22, 1–2 (1978), 388–401.

¹³Bengt Pamp, "Names and Meanings: a Mentalistic Approach," *Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences*, Cracow 1978, Vol. II (Cracow 1982), 231–237.

¹⁴John R. Searle, "The problem of Proper names." In: *Semantics*, eds. Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 134–141, (reprinted from J.R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, 1969), 162–174. See also "Proper Names," *Mind*, 67 (1958), 166–173, and M. McKinsey, "Searle on Proper Names," *The Philosophical Review*, 80 (1971), 220–229.

¹⁵Hartwig Kalverkämper, *Textlinguistik der Eigennamen* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978).

¹⁶Hartwig Kalverkämper, *Eigennamen und Kontext*. Inaugural-Dissertation, Universität Bielefeld, 1976.

¹⁷See, for example, André Lapierre, "Quelques problèmes de contact des langues en toponymie Ontarienne," *Onomastica*, 58 (1980), 18–27.

¹⁸Ernst Pulgram, "Theory of Proper Names," *Beiträge zur Namenforschung*, 5, 2 (1954), 149–196 (reprinted Berkeley, American Name Society, 1954). – John Algeo, *On Defining the Proper Name*. University of Florida Humanities Monograph, 41 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1973).

¹⁹This is a sampling of recent publications on this topic: Dietrich Gerhardt, "Über die Stellung der Namen im lexikalischen System," *Beiträge zur Namenforschung*, 1 (1949–50), 1–24. – J. Kurylowicz, "La position linguistique du nom propre," *Onomastica* (Wrocław), 1956, 1–14. – W.S. Allen, "'Proper Names' in Onomastics and Linguistics," *Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences*, Salamanca 1955 (Salamanca 1958), 195–201. – Holger Steen Sørensen, *Word-Classes in Modern English, with Special Reference to Proper Names*. (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad, 1958). – Peter v. Polenz, "Name und Wort: Bemerkungen zur Methodik der Namendeutung," *Mitteilungen für Namenkunde*, 8 (1960–61), 1–11. – J. Balázs, "Le nom propre dans le système de signe linguistiques," *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Onomastic Sciences*, Florence 1961 (Firenze 1962), 153–159. – Wolfgang Fleischer, "Zum Verhältnis von Name und Appellativ," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe* (1964), 369–378. – H. Vater, "Eigennamen und Gattungsbezeichnungen: Versuch einer Abgrenzung," *Muttersprache*, 75 (1965), 207–

213. – Friedhelm Debus, *Aspekte zum Verhältnis Name – Wort* (Groningen, 1966), partially reprinted in: Hugo Steger (ed.), *Probleme der Namenforschung im deutschsprachigen Raum* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977), 3–25. – Odo Leys, “Der Eigennamen in seinem formalen Verhältnis zum Appellativ,” *Beiträge zur Namenforschung* N.F., 1 (1966), 113–123. – Witold Mańczak, “Le nom propre et le nom commun,” *Revue Internationale d’Onomastique*, 20 (1968), 205–218. – Ralph B. Long, “The Grammar of English Proper Names,” *Names*, 17 (1969), 107–126. – Clarence Sloat, “Proper Names in English,” *Language* 45 (1969), 26–30. – E. Barth, “Zur Theorie der Struktur des Namens,” *Naamkunde*, 1 (1969), 41–44. – Witold Mańczak, “Difference entre nom propre et nom commun,” *Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences*, Vienna 1969, Vol. II, 285–291. – O. Werner, “Appellativa – Nomina propria,” *International Congress of Linguists* (Bologna), 1972, 678–691. – Rainer Wimmer, “Zur Theorie der Eigennamen,” *Linguistische Berichte*, 17 (1972), 70–75. – G.E. Broij, “Eigennamen,” *Tabu* (Groningen), 3, 1 (1972–73), 9–11. – Rainer Wimmer, *Der Eigennamen im Deutschen: Ein Beitrag zu seiner linguistischen Beschreibung*, Linguistische Arbeiten 11 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1973). – W.F.H. Nicolaisen, “Words as Names,” *Onoma*, 20 (1976), 142–163. – Witold Mańczak, “La notion de nom propre,” *Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences*, Cracow 1978, Vol. II (Cracow 1982), 101–106. – Karel Oliva, “Appellativ und Eigenname,” *ibid.*, 227–230. – Rudolf Šrámek, “Das onymische und das appellativische Objekt,” *ibid.*, 503–512. – Petar Simunovic, “An der Grenze von Toponym und Appellativ,” *ibid.*, 495–502. – Eugeniusz Grodziński, “Proper Names, Common Names and Singular Descriptions,” *Onoma*, 24, 1–3 (1980), 10–15.

²⁰These are just a few examples: H.S. Sørensen, *The Meaning of Proper Names* (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad, 1963). – Sidney Zink, “The Meaning of Proper Names,” *Mind*, 72 (1963), 481–499. – F. Zaheeh, *What Is in a Name? An Inquiry into the Semantics and Pragmatics of Proper Names* (The Hague, 1968). – Richard Campbell, “Proper Names,” *Mind*, 77 (1968), 326–350. – C. Kirwan, “On the Connotation and Sense of Proper Names,” *Mind*, 77 (1968), 500–511. – Aimo Seppänen, *Proper Names in English: A Study in Semantics and Syntax*. Publications of the Department of English Philology No. 1 (Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere). – B. Sciarone, “Proper names and meaning,” *Studia Linguistica*, 21 (1969), 77–86. – Saul Kripke, “Naming and Necessity,” in: D. Davidson and G. Harmon (eds.), *Semantics of Natural Language* (Dordrecht, 1972), 253–375. – Paul Ziff, “About Proper Names,” *Mind*, 86 (1977), 319–332. – W.F.H. Nicolaisen, “Are There Connotative Names?” *Names*, 26 (1978), 40–47.

²¹Two articles on English and Scandinavian elements in English place names, respectively; one review; and one paper on Indo-European theophoric personal names.

²²Janet H. Ritzner, “Seventeenth Century Generic Place-Names: Culture and Process on the Eastern Shore,” *Names*, 20 (1972), 231–239.

²³Celia Millward, “Place-Name Generics in Providence, R.I., 1936–1736,” *Names*, 19 (1971), 153–166; and “Universals in Place Name Generics,” *Indiana Names*, 3, 2 (Fall 1972), 48–53.

²⁴Wilbur Zelinsky, “Classical Town Names in the United States: The Historical Geography of an American Idea,” *The Geographical Review*, 57 (1967), 463–495.

²⁵For example, Meredith F. Burrill, “The Language of Geography,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 58, 1 (March 1968), 1–11. – Donald J. Orth, “The Nature of Topographic Terms,” *Indiana Names*, 3, 1 (Spring 1972), 5–18; and “Words, Thought, and Landscape,” *Surveying and Mapping*, 32, 3 (September 1972), 363–367.

²⁶W.F.H. Nicolaisen, “Aspects of Scottish Mountain Names,” *Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences*, Vienna 1969, Vol. II, 109–115. – “Lexical and Onomastic Fields,” *Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences*, Cracow 1978, Vol. II (Cracow 1982), 209–216. – “Onomastic Dialects,” *American Speech*, 55, 1 (Spring 1980), 36–45.

²⁷See, for instance, W.F.H. Nicolaisen, “The Prodigious Jump: A Contribution to the Study of the Relationship between Folklore and Place-Names,” *Volksüberlieferung*, Festschrift für Kurt Ranke (Göttingen 1968), 431–442. – “Place-Name Legends: An Onomastic Mythology,” *Folk-*

lore, 87 (1976), 146–159. – “Place-Names and Their Stories,” *Ortnamssällskapets i Uppsala Arsskrift*, 1977, 23–29.

²⁸Leonard R.N. Ashley, “The Names of Games and the Games of Names: The Onomasticon of Edward Albee’s Plays,” *Names*, 30 (1982), 143–170 (see p. 169).

²⁹Utley, “Linguistic Component,” 159.

³⁰I am here echoing an idea injected into the discussion of the original paper, by André Lapierre, at the Vancouver Meeting of the CSSN.