Names, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1985)

Amish By-Names

WERNER ENNINGER

1. Subject and goals

This paper resumes a subject that has been topicalized in various articles under the label of "Amish nicknames." The studies by Mook[1], Troyer[2], E.L. Smith[3], Yoder[4] reflect above all the following goals and approaches. On the level of name forms, the overriding goal has been the collection and classification of items which are considered to be instances of (the undefined category of) nicknames. On the functional level, the discussion of such items has so far focused on their referential function in establishing singular definite reference and also — though to a lesser degree — on their vocative function in establishing singular address in face-to-face interaction.

The concentration on these two functions reflects the predominance of referent-semantic thought, the bias towards the conceiving of names as labels only. One might say the items considered as nicknames have almost exclusively been treated as having reference, but neither meaning nor social significance. There is no doubt that in discussing proper names referent-semantic approaches must necessarily be central. However, within the predominant labelling approach there has been little or no room for questions such as: Do not the so-called nicknames of the Amish also have descriptive and connotative meaning, synchronically retrievable from their constituent structure? Do they not have the status of appellatives, and does this status not explain the observable restrictions on their use in the referential and vocative functions? Are not these highly individualized appellatives (in the form of definite descriptions) nodes in the unofficial socio-psychological network of personal relations and therefore socio-psychologically significant, while the legal names are significant socio-culturally? Does the co-existence of a repertoire of first names and of a repertoire of the so-called nicknames not constitute a dual paradigm for nominal address and reference that can be exploited for what Goffmann calls face-work?[5]

The present paper seeks to show the relevance of these neglected questions for Amish onomastics. In view of the impressive data-collection in the extant

literature, this paper will not so much attempt to present new facts as rather a fresh grouping of facts. Therefore, this paper will, first, outline the traditional treatment of what is subsumed under the term "nickname" in the extant literature. Then the re-grouping of the extant results will be attempted with reference to linguistic, ethno-linguistic and pragmatic concepts.

This will be done in three respects. With reference to the concept of performative nomination (and its variants), the paper will seek a pragmatics-based definition of (legal) family names, (legal) given names, and unofficial by-names. This is warranted by the indiscriminate application of the term "nickname" to quite diverse onomastic items in the extant literature. This attempt at re-grouping warrants, second, a discussion of the linguistic status of various classes of Amish legal names and by-names. This section will have to resume the traditional discussion of proper name vs. appellative and of the translatability of name-classes. This attempt at re-grouping warrants, third, a discussion of the function of Amish legal names in (unintentionally) signifying and (intentionally) communicating socio-cultural vs. socio-psychological meaning (identity), as well as the complementary functions of first names and by-names in doing face-work.

2. Approaches of previous studies to Amish "nicknames"

The Amish names whose characteristics we will later discuss under the concept of "by-name" have so far been treated under the label of "nickname." However, not one of the studies attempts a definition of the range of onomastic phenomena to be included in the analysis. Since there is little agreement among anthroponymists with regard to onomastic labels such as nickname, by-name, alternative name, characteristic by-name,[6] a working definition would have seemed appropriate, and in its absence one can only go by its use in the extant studies.

The use of the term "nickname" and the treatment of the items subsumed under the concept of 'nickname' in the extant literature can be characterized as follows:

1) The term "nickname" is used with a large range of applications so that the onomastic phenomena included in the discussion comprise a) non-legal, additional or substitute names, b) clipped and diminutive forms of first names used as legal names,[7] c) middle initials,[8] ministerial titles[9] as well as d) definite descriptions.[10] The variety of onomastic phenomena thus included appears to exceed even the denotational range of the undefined term "nickname" as it is used in everyday speech.

2) Within this wide referential range long lists of names are compiled. Yoder, for example, elicited more than 400 nicknames in the Old Order Amish, Beachy Amish, Conservative Mennonite and Old Mennonite communities of Southern Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and Garrett County, Maryland. The material collected by Mook, E.L. Smith, Troyer and Yoder is extremely impressive and does not warrant any additions.

3) The items in these lists are classified acording to formal structure and circumstances of origin. Mook[11] develops a taxonomy of eight classes: a) nicknames created by abbreviating the first name, b) nicknames derived from physical characteristics, c) nicknames based on an individual's mental or physical habits, his characteristic attitudes, his decided preferences, or some other aspect of his personality, d) nicknames derived from a humorous happening or otherwise minor but memorable event in the life of the person, e) patronymic and matronymic nicknames, as e.g., *Nancy-John* and *Nancy-Jake*, f) nicknames based on an elliptical combination of first name and middle initial, as e.g., *Isaac Z.* becoming *Iksie*, g) nicknames based on occupation, as e.g., *Chicken Elam*, h) toponymic nicknames, as e.g., *Turnpike Joe*. This taxonomy developed by Mook is the most explicit and comprehensive attempt at classifying Amish nicknames on the basis of their formal patterns and their respective origins.

4) With regard to the function of the repertoire of nicknames — which is said to be the largest repertoire of nicknames of any speech community of which we have adequate information[12] — the extant literature predominantly focuses on the necessity of nicknames for establishing singular definite reference. Mock's pertinent view appears to be the source of this line of thought: Having described the limited repertoire of Amish first names, he concludes that the extensive creation of nicknames is a precondition for establishing singular definite reference.

> Thus it sometimes happens that several individuals in a community will have the same first name, the same middle initial, and the same family name. In such communities, nicknaming runs rife, almost as an onomastic necessity, and it is obvious to all, including even the least observant, that the Amish employ more nicknames than their non-Amish neighbors.[13]

Hostetler[14] quotes Mook's tenet verbatim, while Troyer phrases the idea in a different way:

> With the Amish love for naming their sons after close kin, both given and family names frequently occur identically in the same communities. Needless to say this breeds confusion no end. So nicknames quite naturally emerge so that referents can be more easily distinguished.[15]

Yoder voices the same view as follows:

> In a society where personal names and family names frequently occur identically in the same *freindschaft* or community, nicknames flourish.[16]

We hesitate to accept this treatment of what is subsumed under nicknames as the final analysis, and we suggest their re-analysis within a more comprehensive heuristic grid.

3. Variants of nomination as distinctive criteria of Amish family names, first names, and by-names

In order to obtain a criterion that — at least *pro tem* — separates Amish by-names from other classes of anthroponyms, we resort to the concept of performative nomination as developed in the theory of speech acts. As in most Western cultures today, family names among the Amish are hereditary and therefore separated from the other classes of anthroponyms by the fact that they are not part of any act of performative nomination. (The exceptions are cases of explicit performative renomination of adoptees and implicit renomination of women who on marriage assume their husband's family name.) By contrast, first names and by-names are "given" names whose assignment is always performed through acts of nomination.

With regard to first names — which provide the standard example of performative nomination "I herewith baptize you . . ." — three culture-specific modifications appear appropriate. The earlier theory of speech acts assumed that acts of nomination are a) institutional speech acts, b) acts of baptizing, and c) verbally explicit acts[17]. Not one of these criteria is necessary for acts of nomination among the Amish.

a) Among the Amish — as in most anti-pedobaptist churches[18] — first name giving is neither part of an informal kinship ceremony convened by the parents, nor part of institutionalized rites of passage performed by an agent of the church. Naming is a non-ceremonial and non-ritual event; babies who are born in hospitals are usually (required to be) named on the first day for the hospital's record; babies who are born at home are usually named within three or four days. Ministers play no part in nominating children, except their own. Performative nomination (in the sense of first name-giving) is not an institutional act.

b) Among the Amish — as in all anti-pedobaptist churches — baptism follows first name giving only after 16 to 18 years. That is, the ordinance of baptism, which is performed by a bishop, is thus also separated in time from the non-institutional performative nomination.

c) The non-institutional act of first naming is performed by the persons authorized for this act, i.e., the parents, who, however, are neither required to use a specific formula, nor to make the performative nomination verbally explicit in verbs like *call, name, nominate*. Even verbless utterances like *Okay*: *Amos* would suffice.

In order to distinguish by-names from both family names and first names, we further specify the qualities of the nominator and the nominee, as well as the source of the respective name-classes. With regard to origin, family names are inherited, and first names are selected from an established repertoire and assigned to the nominee by an authorized person. While with these two classes the nominee is only a passive recipient, he plays an active rôle in the genesis of by-names insofar as he at least gives the cue that motivates the creative nomination, with even a completely novel coinage, by anyone in his surroundings who feels provoked to earmark him for the nominee-produced cue. In that sense the by-name is acquired.

The origin of family names, first names and by-names has consequences for their respective functional distribution. While the legally inherited family name and the first name that is assigned by authorized agents are the only acceptable names for legal transactions within the power network, a by-name is an ekename (O.E. *ēac nama*), an alternative name that typically substitutes the family and the first name in the least formal and most intimate register of communication that is used in the solidarity network. In this respect, family names and first names on the one hand, and by-names on the other, are in complementary distribution. In terms of socio-onomastics, the former are part of the high variety, the latter are part of the low variety of the onomastic repertoire of the Amish, and each variety has its domain of appropriate use.

Although this statement concerning the functional distribution of name classes will have to be refined below, the above criteria provide a clearer delimitation of name classes of the Amish onomastic repertoire. From the perspective of this pro-tem definition, the term "nickname" as used in the extant literature on Amish names appears to represent a residual category that subsumes too disparate phenomena. Clipped and diminutive first names used as legal names, as well as middle initials, we suggest, should be analyzed along with all other officiallly given names used in the register of legal formal communication. Ministerial titles too, like first names, are given by an authorized body, and unlike first names and family names can be withdrawn by the same authorized body; bishops and preachers may be "benched," i.e., they may lose their privilege of "standing up" (i.e., 'preaching') in the church service. Ministerial titles, then, and definite descriptions, we suggest, are to be treated outside onomastics, for example within the

class of referring expressions (which includes names, but not vice versa).

That will leave some types of so-called nicknames, all of which share both the criterion of being acquired and the criterion of being used in the most informal solidarity register. Such a reclassification would leave a more homogeneous class of names. The members of this class will here be called by-names.

In the following sections, we will attempt to show that the members of this class of Amish names share a third criterion, which sets them apart from both family names and first names. The screening efforts of Amish informants reported by Yoder and experienced in our own field work — which are in striking contrast to volunteering information about family names, first-naming practices and the selection of middle initials — indicate that the by-names are a sensitive area and that there is more to Amish by-names than just their function in establishing singular definite reference. We will argue that the traditional discussion of nicknames from the perspective of their referential and vocative function alone is reductive, and that by-names have not only reference, but also cognitive and emotional meaning, as well as a specific pragmatic force.

4. The linguistic status of Amish by-names

In view of the fact that the basic function of (generic, appellative) words is still often seen as that of naming (in the popular tradition of Genesis and Augustine words are considered names of things, a view that Ryle termed the "Fido-Fido" approach), it cannot come as a surprise that sometimes the only function of names is seen as that of naming, i.e., labeling and identifying a referent. What thus implicitly lingers on — also in the discussion of Amish names — is what Akinnaso summarized and attacked as the traditional European approach to names:

> Received notions about the arbitrariness of personal names are based on the cultural attitude that personal names, as labels, are not supposed to have semantic content — i.e., the encoding of retrievable information in their lexico-grammatical structure. This attitude roughly typifies the European conception of the semantico-cultural significance of personal names and contrasts with widely held views about the subject in several other parts of the world, especially Africa, Asia, Oceania, and aboriginal North America.[19]

To be sure, Akinnaso could have adduced a host of witnesses for the predominance of the modified "names-have-no-meaning" view in the European line of thought, among them Hermann Ammann, Gilbert Ryle, and John Lyons.[20] On the other hand, the long controversy concerning the semantic status of

names among philosophers, linguists, and onomatologists[21] indicates the existence of arguments against the arbitrariness both of the form of names, and of the relationship between the form of the name and its referent.

If names were just arbitrary labels, and if singular definite reference and address were their only functions, the arbitrary assignment of arbitrary combinations of arbitrary letters or numbers would not only suffice, but would be ideal. Balinese naming practices appear to operate on the basis of this principle. Geertz reports that Balinese personal names are arbitrarily coined nonsense syllables, which makes Balinese personal names unique to specific individuals.[22] One wonders, though, why these apparently ideal unique labels (one referent: one label) should hardly ever be used in social interaction. By comparison even name-giving in the Fancy Name Belt[23] is far from being arbitrary; it is, rather, governed by notions of euphonia and associations with famous personalities.

Furthermore, onomastics has shown that in almost every Western speech community notions of appropriateness of first name assignment obtain which extend beyond the obligatory norms stipulated by governments. Amish first-naming, for one, is not arbitrary, but strictly rule-governed. This does not mean that first-naming follows fixed scripts and that names are invariant. Rule-governed, in this instance, means that expectations for naming exist that are culturally determined, and that those expectations guide naming and act to constrain the options for what name will or can occur.[24] The prevalence of Old Testament first names and the significant absence of both bisexual names and arbitrary creations of fancy names, etc., attest to that.

We suggest that to the extent to which name selection is subject to socio-cultural considerations of appropriateness, names do not only label individual referents, but carry more than referential meaning. From Amish first names we can retrieve information about the Biblical orientation of the nominators and, perhaps, of the nominees. From middle initials — which are predominantly assigned according to one of two competing "Leitnamen" patterns —we can retrieve information about the genealogies of the name-bearers. From the practically closed list of 126 Amish family names[25] (distributed over more than 85,000 individuals) we can retrieve information about the behavioral acceptance of or compliance with the norms of endogamy and non-proselytizing, and historical information about the European origins of families and their migration patterns.

Thus, Amish first names, middle initials/names, and family names do not only label a referent. They are rather — in a strictly semiotic sense — indexical signs indicating value orientations and norms obtaining in the Amish universe of discourse. It is these socio-cultural meaning components of Amish first names, middle initials/names, and family names which make

(Amish) names so valuable to sociologists, anthropologists, demographers, historians, genealogists and geneticists, who do not investigate individuals and their onomastic labels per se, but who rather take the onomastic labels of individuals as indices of the relationship among individuals on the various parameters of a culture under investigation.

The onomastic phenomena here called by-names differ from the above name classes in two respects. To the extent that their knowledge is shared in a universe of discourse, they are more effective tools in establishing singular definite reference insofar as they are not shared with many other referents, but rather highly individualized onomastic items. While this referent-semantic aspect has been the main concern of the extant literature on what is there called nicknames, the fact that most of them derive their superior referential and social force from an individualized descriptive and/or evaluative meaning component inherent in the by-name and thus retrievable from its constituent structure has received little attention. In contrast to Amish first names they do not originate through the re-bestowal of a ready-made label shared with many others, but through a creative ad hoc coinage motivated by a specific highly individual or even unique characteristic of the one so named, and of which characteristic trait the by-name is either echoic or even descriptive. In Peirce's terms, an (onomatopoetic) echoic by-name signifies a characteristic of its bearer iconically, while a descriptive by-name signifies a characteristic of its bearer symbolically. (For exceptions to this, cf. below).

Among the merely echoic by-names we count the following examples by Yoder:[26] *Daisy* ('child's pronunciation of Grace'), *Dus* ('child who couldn't pronounce *gross mammy* ['grandmother']), *Golly John* ('often said *Golly*'), *Gix* ('child's attempt to say *Christ*'), *Gib* ('child's attempt at *Clifford*'), *Hey Chon* ('His father would speak to him with *Hey Chon!*'), *Hey Chon Choe* ('Son of Hey Chon?'), *Hoofy* ('child's attempt at *Ruth*'), *Toitz* ('attempt at *Joyce* by child'). These highly individualized by-names originating in echoing a pronunciation characteristic (of a child) we will call echoic by-names.

The same individual pronunciation behavior can, however, not only be echoed, but also be caught in a descriptive definition that from the moment of its coinage may function as a descriptive by-name: *Dutch* (because of his "Dutch" accent). Here, one can claim that the name — being a unique description — begins to have meaning which to the insider is retrievable from an appellative in name function. Once acts of nomination resort to definite and unique descriptions, not only sound characteristics can be caught in description by-names, but any other characteristic just as well. Most of Lorenzo D. Turner's collection of nicknames (petnames, basket names) in the Gullah dialect[27] and many of the nicknames described by Mook fall into

what we call descriptive names: *Big Ben Stoltzfus, Chicken Elam, Coonie Jonathan, Gravy Dan, Turnpike Joe, Bluey* ('liked to shell (*blick*) beans'), *Fuzzy / Curly John, Flaxie* ('flaxen-haired girl in dark-haired family'). It is true that many family names and first names once originated in the same way, yet while their origins from definite descriptions are in most cases lost to their present-day bearers and users, the origin of such by-names as above from definite descriptions is part of their users' knowledge, because they are synchronically motivated attributes descriptive of the name-bearers. With regard to their formation, descriptive by-names illustrate the reversed process of antonomasia: while the term "antonomasia" conceptualizes the transition of a name into the class of appellatives (*He is a Quisling, a Judas, a Don Juan, a filibuster, a maverick,* etc. — the latter sometimes losing even their capital initials —), this kind of by-naming is based on the transition of appellatives into the class of names. And because this transition is not historical, but a contemporaneous event, such names have cognitive information which — to the insider who shares the relevant knowledge — is retrievable from their formal constituents, and which is descriptive of its bearer.

The distinct linguistic status of such names is borne out in a comparative transference test of Amish names. While first names and family names may be borrowed (with concomitant phonological and phonotactical adjustment to the patterns of the recipient language), the (descriptive constituents of) by-names can also be translated, as the examples from Troyer's and Yoder's list show: *Duwak Ksicht: Tobacco Face; Hengshta Noah: Stallion Noah; Abara Eli: Strawberry Eli; Dauma George: Thumb George; Eema Joe: Bee Joe; Loch Simmy: Hole Simmy; Davy Hans (Tauben Hans): Pigeon John; Glee Eli: Little Eli.*

Among the by-names of the Amish there is a further class whose members do not only fulfill the criterion of 'highly individualized appellative' plus the criterion of 'definite description with retrievable cognitive information,' but whose members also have a non-cognitive semantic component. On the utterance level the members of this class function as 1) evaluative expressions insofar as they carry the speaker's personal (and social) attitude towards the bearer of the name; and 2) conative expressions insofar as they shape the hearer's attitude towards the bearer of the name. Such by-names do not only single out and describe the one so singled out, but they ascribe at the same time evaluations to him or her and place him or her on a moral, esthetic, appreciative, etc., scale. Meaningful hypocoristic by-names[28] are examples of the positively evaluative by-names: *Sonny* ('little son'), *Girlie* ('little girl'), *Honey*, *Smiley* ('always had a smile'); cases of negatively evaluative by-names (on various scales) are less hard to find: *Porky Dan, Hump Levi,*

Humpy, Grumpy Aaron, Rags John, Sloppy Steve, Slop Dora, Bocky ('stubborn') *John, Beer Danny, Hussa-Orsh Mose* 'Trouser-Seat Mose' (lit. 'Trouser Ass Mose'), *Rowdy Bill/Wild Bill, Bloaty, Dirty Tom, Sleep* ('used to sleep in church'), *Mud Andy, Schmutz* ('dirt'), *Jack, Shmutsich* ('dirty') *Sam, Mud, Scarecrow.*

If one were to use the ambivalent term "nickname" at all, the latter class of descriptive and negatively evaluative by-names would be an appropriate class of referents, because in the bilingual (trilingual?) repertoire of the Amish the term "nickname" appears to be associated with German "Neckname" (from *necken*, 'to make fun of s.b.') rather than with the metanalzyed English "an ekename > a nickname". The fact that the Standards of the Old Order Amish Parochial and Vocational Schools of Pennsylvania[29] mention "No nick names" in the frame of "Teasing of children (him or her) not allowed" and "No by-words allowed" supports the above sugggestion and, at the same time, bears witness to the fact that by-naming and nicknaming is a major concern in the culture.

The screening efforts of Amish informants with regard to by-names are just another indicator of the high socio-cultural sensitivity of this (acquired) part of the onomastic repertoire. Goffman's (1967) concept of "free" and "non-free" goods of a culture, and Lakoff's transfer of this notion from material goods to socio-cultural information, make the hedging strategies of Amish informants with regard to certain by-names understandable as instances of protecting non-free information.

> Clearly there are some topics that one may ask freely and others that are 'none of your business' — that is, non-free goods.[30]

What makes certain Amish by-names — and probably certain by-names across cultures — non-free goods could tentatively be explained by the fact that the utterance of a by-name alone is, in terms of the theory of speech acts, a complete proposition which consists of an act of reference plus an act of predication of the type "The one who did. . . ." Not only does a highly individualized by-name more effectively establish singular definite reference than a first name or a family name shared with many others, it furthermore often makes a descriptive and evaluative predication on the isolated referents, which first names and family names as a rule do not do.

Although the above consideration of the respective linguistic statuses of legal names vs. by-names is based on the evidence of one specific culture, one wonders whether or not these considerations might not throw light on the fundamentally opposing accounts of the linguistic status of proper names among philosophers. Bean summarizes these views as follows:

> . . . in one [of the fundamentally opposing accounts] proper names simply stand for something, but in no particular respect, in the other proper names are shorthand definite descriptions. The first point of view is prominently represented by J.S. Mill: proper names 'denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals'. . . For Mill, "proper names are attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on the continuance of any attribute of the object" (Mill 1889:20). Fundamentally, proper names simply stand for their bearers; whether they signify some attribute(s) of the bearers is strictly secondary. Others have argued that proper names do indeed signify, i.e., have senses. In this view proper names denote individuals by functioning as shorthand for, or equivalent to, definite descriptions of their bearers (e.g., Frege 1969:167).[31]

The ethnographer who thinks to have isolated distinctive classes of anthroponyms wonders whether these fundamentally opposed views of the linguistic status of proper names are not a by-product of the fact that all subclasses of anthroponyms as well as toponyms (as in Mill's example of "Dartmouth") are treated as one single, linguistically homogeneous class of proper names. Family names such as *Jones, Finnie* and *Bowen* might be excellent illustrations of Mill's view, while by-names such as *Flaxen, Tobacco-Face* and *Hump* would be in accordance with Frege's view. What appears to be a fundamental opposition of views might eventually turn out to be accounts of such different phenomena as first names, family names, by-names, etc. Such a differential approach can be shown to be helpful in an assessment of the different rôles that such subclasses play in social life.

5. The rôle of by-names in 'doing' identity-work and face-work

The concluding section formulates an attempt at understanding the respective functions of legal names vs. by-names in the onomastic repertoire of the Amish, and at understanding the respective rôles of first names vs. by-names in the dual system of nominal address in the Amish speaking economy. With regard to the first goal we start from the following assumption:

> . . . since one's identity as a person and as a member of society is an object of universal concern, personal naming practices relate to identity concerns in all cultures. But as Goodenough notes, "the directions and emphases for their concerns vary from individual to individual and modally from one social group to another." Thus, when he compared Trukese and Lakalai personal naming systems, Goodenough found that while the Trukese personal naming system serves to emphasize individuality and give it explicit recognition, the

Lakalai system emphasizes one's place in the procreational chain or in formally structured kin and social relationships.[32]

The interpretation of Amish names that offers itself is that in the Amish onomastic repertoire legal names (including family names, first names, middle initials/names) and by-names are complementarily distributed over the concerns of social vs. personal identity. Markers of social identity are found on the level of family names inherited from the practically closed list of 126 family names. They are indices of kinship identity and of the identity of norm orientation with regard to the principles of endogamy and of non-proposelytizing. Social identity is, furthermore, sought on the level of first names, in whose bestowal the authorized nominator as a rule selects from the tradition-sanctioned list of Old Testament names. Such choices are indices of identity of value orientation.

Both these classes signal, as it were, ethnico-genetic cohesion and socio-religious solidarity of a minority culture exposed to the acculturation pressures of mainstream society. Together with the two maintained German-based varieties in the linguistic repertoire of the Amish, these two onomastic classes, which are the formal-official onomastic varieties in the overall onomastic repertoire, function as linguistic exponents of ethnic identity. In rare instances the expression of personal identity may be sought by the first name-giver who deviates from the tradition-sanctioned and institutionalized list of 'our' first names. Acceptance of or compliance with vs. deviation from the socially appropriate first names are thus acts that operate towards or against the expression of socio-cultural and personal identity, respectively. In this culture that puts a premium on social rather than personal identity, considerations of socio-cultural appropriateness prevail in bestowing first names. Thus the two name-classes that are part of the legal, formal and official onomastic and linguistic register — which is the only one used in intercultural transactions — both predominantly signify social identity, and function as symbolic demarcations of socio-cultural boundaries.

Conversely, personal identity is expressed — and often suffered — on the level of the informal variety of highly individualized, descriptive and evaluative by-names, whose assignment very often lacks any sense of onomastic decorum. In contrast with the names of the formal register, by-names are typically reserved for culture-internal interaction. The by-names constitute, as it were, the informal onomastic register. They are nodes in the internal network of unofficial socio-psychological relationships, in which members are highlighted as hardly mistakable individualities. In this domain, we suggest, by-naming does not only run rife as a necessity for satisfactory reference, but results also from the psychological urge of giving the social persona within the brotherhood of equals a sharper individual profile. By-

names are not only referential distinguishers, but also socio-psychological markers. The expression of individuation is sought on exactly that level of anthroponyms which is best suited for the expression of an infinity of such socio-psychological markings. In bestowing by-names one does not select one of the prefabricated, institutionalized labels, but rather operates a creative and productive mechanism, by means of which an infinity of telling 'appellative names' can be generated, tailored so as to exactly catch an individual's idiosyncrasies. The legal family names and first names on the one hand, and the unofficial by-names thus can be said to play distinctive and complementary rôles in doing identity work.

A final word is appropriate with regard to the rôles of first names and by-names in the dual system of nominal address in the Amish speaking economy. For culture-internal interaction the Amish system of pronominal address has only invariant *Du*, irrespective of sex, age, status and degree of familiarity of the interactants. After all, intra-group interaction is performed in the solidarity network of brethren and sisters which is at the same time a kinship network of close to distant relatives, i.e., "die freindschaft." A ritual of passage from *Vous* to *Tu* is, consequently, nonexistent.

The one-element system of (culture-internal) pronominal address has its counterpart in a dual system of nominal address. However, in harmony with the absence of the *Vous* from the pronominal paradigm, its options are not "Mr. plus last name" vs. "first name," but rather "first name" vs. "by-name." In certain face-to-face situations *Benjamin* and *Bennie* as well as *Mose* and *Hussah Orsh Mose* are equivalent means of establishing singular definite address (and reference). If the vocative (and referential) function were the only functions of those options, they would be free variants of each other and they could be used interchangeably. In fact, however, these options are subject to usage restrictions. In analogy to the restriction operating on pronominal address,[33] we distinguish between situational and face/politeness restrictions.

For institutional situations such as church service (with its events of *Abrath* including the teaching of applicants for baptism, witnessing, announcements, congregation meeting), school board meetings, instruction in the parochial and vocational schools, a first-naming rule applies. The consistent use of first names and the equally consistent non-use of by-names has as a consequence that such situations are interactively defined as institutional situations in which participants act as agents and clients of the institution.

For non-institutional face-to-face situations in which participants interact as individuals more elaborate rules obtain. We take the incidence of any by-name as an indicator of the fact that at least one of the participants construes the situation as an informal one, and we furthermore suggest that

the overall ratio of first names: by-names in a given situation is a measure of the degree to which the participants share the informal construal of the situation. The following rules of nominal address appear to obtain: the use of hypocoristic by-names (*Sonny, Benny*) and merely descriptive by-names (*Turnpike Joe, Eema Joe*) are socially appropriate acts of address, which we interpret as socio-psychological activities that are onomastic exponents of what Goffman calls "face-work."

> The combined efforts of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that the person tends to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants.[34]

Goffman summarizes all acts that maintain the face of both ego and alter under the term "face-work." Brown and Levinson appear to elaborate this notion when they distinguish between negative and positive faces.

> (a) negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal reserves, rights to non-distraction — i.e., the freedom of action and freedom from imposition.
> (b) positive face: the positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants.[35]

Negative and positive face-work is the enactment of

> the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others. . . and the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.[36]

The use of positively evaluative and merely descriptive by-names in acts of address constitutes, we suggest, positive face-work insofar as the user demonstrates that he has been initiated to the non-free goods, i.e., the "secret" onomastic information of the insiders of the we-group.

The use of positively evaluative by-names in acts of address is, furthermore, an explicit attempt at being appreciated by his/her interactants. Conversely, there appears to be a rule not to use negatively evaluative by-names in acts of address but to use rather the first name that identifies the same addressee; thus *Mose*, rather than *Hussa Orsh Mose*, in address function. The selection of the first name option is, we suggest, an instance of negative face-work insofar as an invasion of the addressee's territory is avoided. By contrast, the selection of a negatively evaluated by-name for address is an overt face-threatening act. The same applies for the use of negatively evaluative by-names in acts of reference to co-interactants present in the encounter. For negatively evaluative by-names this implies that their use is largely restricted to identifying absent referents, so the one so named and evaluated may be the last to learn about his by-name.

6. Conclusion

The paper basically sought to suggest that by-names should be treated as a class of anthroponyms that is separated from others by a) a specific act of nomination, b) its specific linguistic status, and c) its specific rôles in doing identity and face-work. Amish by-names appear to be only one case among many in which highly individualized appellatives used for vocative and referential identification are subject to specific usage restrictions.

> The Pawnee attach 'so personal and sacred a meaning . . . to a name as to render it unfit for the familiar purposes of ordinary address' (Fletcher 1899:97). Saramaka 'true' or 'big' names 'epitomize the essence of a thing, are considered private, (and) must be used with circumspection' (Pride and Pride 1972).[37]

A comparative application of the late Erving Goffman's notions of "non-free goods" and of "face-work" to such onomastic phenomena might help to elucidate the rôle of proper names in social life, about which, according to Bean,[38] we still know so little. At present, a comprehensive re-analysis of Amish names from this perspective — which has been shown to be extremely useful by Morgan, et al.[39] — is being undertaken.

Notes

[1]Maurice A. Mook, "Nicknames Among the Amish." *Names*, 15 (1967), 111-118.

[2]Lester O. Troyer, "Amish Nicknames from Holmes County, Ohio," *Pennsylvania Folklife*, 17 (Summer 1968), 24.

[3]Elmer L. Smith, "Amish Names." *Names*, 16 (1968), 105-110.

[4]Eleanor Yoder, "Nicknaming in an Amish-Mennonite Community." *Pennsylvania Folklife*, 23 (Spring 1974), 30-37.

[5]Erving Goffman, *Interaction Rituals: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior* (Garden City/New York: Anchor Books, 1967).

[6]Gillian Fellow Jensen, "Some Problems of a Maverick Anthroponymist," in Herbert Voitl, ed., *The Study of the Personal Names of the British Isles: Proceedings of a Working Conference at Erlangen 21-24 September 1975* (Erlangen, 1976), pp. 43-61; here: pp. 60-61.

[7]Mook (1967), 112-113; Yoder (1974), 32.

[8]Yoder (1974), 32.

[9]Mook (1967), 117.

[10]E.L. Smith (1968), 109, who here quotes *Elam's Benny* from Steinmetz (1950), p. 80.

[11]Mook (1967), 112-118.

[12]Mook (1967), 112; quoted by Yoder (1974), 30.

[13]Mook (1967), 111-112.

[14]John A. Hostetler, *Amish Society* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 243.

[15]Troyer (1968), 24.

[16]Yoder (1974), 34.

[17]Edeltraud Dobnig-Jülch, *Pragmatik und Eigennamen* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1977), pp. 45-70.

[18]Thomas Pyles,"Bible Belt Onomastics or Some Curiosities of Anti-Pedobaptist Nomenclature,"

Names 7 (1959), 84-100; G.R. Beasley-Murray, *Die christliche Taufe: Eine Untersuchung über ihr Verhältnis in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Kassel: Onken, 1968), pp. 399-469.

[19]F. Niyi Akinnaso, "Names and Naming Principles in Cross-Cultural Perspective," *Names*, 29 (March 1981), 37-63; here, 37.

[20]Ammann, *Vom doppelten Sinn der sprachlichen Formen* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1920), pp. 3-10; Ammann, *Die menschliche Rede* (Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), p.67, p.69; first printed in 1925 (part I) and 1928 (part II); Ryle, "The Theory of Meaning," in C.A. Mace, ed., *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957); Lyons, *Semantics I* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 219.

[21]cf. Stephen Ullmann, *Semantics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 71-79; Otto Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1924), p. 66; P.T. Geach, *Reference and Generality* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 27; J. Kurylowicz, "La position linguistique du nom propre," *Esquisses Linguistiques* (1966), 182-192; H.S. Sorenson, *The Meaning of Proper Names* (Copenhagen: Gad, 1963); Adolf Bach, *Deutsche Namenkunde I*, 1 + 2 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1952), pp. 206-303; Wilfried Seibicke, *Die Personennamen im Deutschen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 48-54; R. Wimmer, *Der Eigenname im Deutschen* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1973), pp. 70-121; W.F.H. Nicolaisen, "Are there Connotative Names?" *Names*, 26 (March 1978), 40-47.

[22]Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 369, quoted after Akinnaso (1981), p. 46.

[23]Pyles (1959).

[24]Cf. Judith L. Green,"Research on Teaching as a Linguistic Process" (typescript, University of Delaware, 1982), p. 8.

[25]Hostetler (1980), p. 241.

[26]Yoder (1974), 36-37.

[27]Lorenzo D. Turner, *Africanisms in the Gullah Dialect* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1974), pp. 40-41.

[28]For the sake of brevity we here disregard hypocoristic by-names that originate through appending a diminutive suffix to the legal name, as e.g., *Billy, Benny*. They have a connotational, but not a denotational component beside their referential component.

[29]—, *Minimum Standards for the Amish Parochial and Vocational Schools of the State of Penna.* (Gordonville, Pa.: Gordonville Print Shop, 1969, revised 1973), p. 27.

[30]Robin Lakoff, "What you can do with words: politeness, pragmatics, and performatives" (*Berkeley Studies in Syntax and Semantics I*: XVI, 1974), 1-55; here, 27.

[31]Susan S. Bean, "Ethnology and the Study of Proper Names," *Anthropological Linguistics*, 22, 7 (1980), 305-316.

[32]Akinnaso (1981), 37-38.

[33]Dietrich Hartmann, "Zum Verhältnis von Sprachgebrauch und Sozialstruktur bei pronominalen Anredeformen," in Uta Quasthoff, ed., *Sprachstruktur – Sozialstruktur: Zur linguistischen Theoriebildung* (Königstein, Taunus: Scriptor, 1978), pp. 85-87; here, p. 93.

[34]Goffman (1967), p. 11. I am indebted to Reiner Schulze of the University of Essen for his suggestions concerning the relationships between by-names and face-work.

[35]P.Brown and S. Levinson,"Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena," in E. Goody, ed., *Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 56-311; here p. 66.

[36]Brown and Levinson (1978), p. 67.

[37]Bean (1980), 311.

[38]Bean (1980), 305.

[39]Jane Morgan, Christopher O'Neill and Rom Harré, *Nicknames: Their Origins and Social Consequences* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).