

The True Name Movement: Japanese Teachers' Struggle for Empowering Korean Children.

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Personal naming has been central to the state's control of Koreans in Japan, but it has also been an important political strategy for Korean activists to challenge Japanese authorities. In the 1970s, Japanese teachers in public schools formed a true name movement, in which they encouraged Korean students to discard their false (Japanese) names, declare their true (Korean) names and true identities, and fight against ethnic discrimination. When the movement began, this rhetoric effectively captured the minds of Korean students. However, it became problematic in the 1980s, when the movement gradually spread. More and more Korean children became attached to their Japanese names and took those names as their true names. For them, the rhetoric was a rigid system of ethnic classification, in which a personal name, an ethnic self, and the true self signified one another. Yet, the movement helped them learn the political significance of personal naming.

Colonial Naming Policy and the True Name Movement

Naming is a performative process; names can be used to classify people, but they can also be deployed to subvert imposed classification. Personal naming has been central to the state's control of the resident Koreans in Japan, i.e., those who came from colonial Korea (1910-1945) and their descendents.¹ The Japanese state has pressured them to use Japanese names and has tried to classify them as culturally Japanese while socially discriminating against them. Under this pressure, most resident Koreans have used Japanese names in their daily lives. However, personal naming has also been an important political strategy for Korean activists to challenge Japanese authorities. They have stressed the importance of using Korean names or *honmyō* 'true names' to

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assert the cultural and political presence of Koreans in Japan. In the late 1960s, some liberal Japanese teachers in the public school system began to join them in opposing the assimilationist naming policy, forming a true name movement.² In this article, I examine this movement in the Osaka metropolis, where it began and has been most active in Japan.³ I want to show how Japanese teachers involved in the movement have been trying to empower Korean children.

In colonial Korea, ethnic Koreans were forced to learn Japanese and respect the Japanese emperor while deprived of political rights comparable to those given to ethnic Japanese. In the 1940s, the Japanese empire strengthened its assimilationist policy and compelled Koreans to adopt the naming and household systems of Japan proper (*sôshikai*).⁴ The Koreans who moved to Japan proper and worked as cheap labor in Japanese industries, including those brought over as forced laborers, were assimilated to a more extensive degree than those who remained in Korea. In order to avoid direct discrimination in everyday life, Koreans living in Japan proper began to use Japanese names long before the system of *sôshikai* was implemented. Unless they used Japanese names, it was extremely difficult for them to find jobs or housings. The massacre of some 7,000 Koreans, carried out in large part by civilian Japanese in the aftermath of the 1923 Kantô Earthquake, demonstrated the depth of hatred and fear that many ethnic Japanese held for Koreans. This massacre prompted many Koreans to use Japanese names. By the 1930s, the use of Japanese names had become common practice among Koreans living in Japan proper. Even those Korean construction laborers who worked in mountain regions and hardly interacted with Japanese used Japanese names among themselves. Exceptions were those who came to receive higher education (Kim 1978, 41-45).

By the end of the 1930s, Korean children enrolled in Japanese schools had begun to use Japanese names, following the naming practice of their parents (Ozawa 1973, 101-05).

Recalling his school days in Japan proper in the 1930s, Kim stated that his Japan-born Korean classmates used Japanese names “spontaneously without a sense of acting out” and ended up being “torn between a Korean body and Japanese consciousness.” He accused the Japanese state of producing such *kari no ningen* ‘false person,’ a person who only had a mask without the true self (Ozawa 1973, 106).⁵ Kim himself used his Korean name, thanks to encouragement from his Japanese teacher. Referring to this case, Ozawa pointed out that first-generation Koreans working in the Japanese labor industry used Japanese names purposely for convenience, i.e., they knew that they were performing (101-05). In other words, the Japanese names were “pseudonyms,” not “false names,” for them (Aceto 2002, 583, see below). However, as Morris-Suzuki suggested in reference to Koreans in colonial Karafuto, it might have been sometimes difficult even for first-generation Koreans to maintain “a clear distinction between ‘mask’ and ‘real self’” in practice (2001, 665). One can imagine how difficult it must have been for Japan-born Koreans growing up with their parents calling them by Japanese names to keep that distinction.

Those idioms, i.e., “false person,” “mask,” and “real self,” were found in the rhetoric of the true name movement. In it, a Korean using a Japanese name was seen as a false person and encouraged to use a Korean name, reveal the true self, and take off the Japanese mask. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the movement was on the rise, this rhetoric effectively captured the minds of some Korean children, leading them to come out and declare their true legal names, i.e. their Korean names. However, the rhetoric began to lose its validity in the late 1980s, when the movement spread widely and affected regional boards of education. More and more Korean children became attached to their Japanese names and took those names as their true names.

In what follows, I discuss the historical trajectory of the movement from the late 1960s through the start of the 2000s,

focusing on how teachers interpreted the concepts of true name and ethnicity. I will first look at some literature on naming and ethnicity relevant to this article and provide a brief history of the Koreans in postwar Japan, focusing on naming practices. I will then delineate how the movement emerged in Takatsuki and Osaka Cities. Next, I will discuss in general terms how the movement developed in the 1980s and 1990s. Then, I will look into the case of a high school teacher in Amagasaki City who was influential in the 1990s. By examining this case in detail, I want to shed light on fundamental problems in the true name movement. Finally, I will discuss what Japanese teachers have accomplished in the movement.

Much of the following discussion is based on my fieldwork in Osaka. Between 2001 and 2005, I made eight trips to this city, each time spending one to four months. In Osaka, I did ethnographic participant observation in ethnic studies classes and teachers' meetings, and conducted in-depth interviews with Japanese teachers, Korean college students, and Korean activists.

Personal Names and Ethnicity

Critical of the structuralist view of naming as a static system of classification, Rosaldo (1984) captures naming as a dynamic performative process that involves active agents. Naming generates various kinds of meanings and consequences, both personal and social, and can be also intentionally deployed as a classification system. As Arno points out, "giving names and using them are distinct illocutionary acts and therefore imply sets of conventionally accepted intentions or motivations on the part of the name giver or user" (1994, 24). Like other kinds of names, personal names are used in performative ways, serving different functions in different social contexts. In Fiji, personal names may signify certain emotions and political motives (Arno 1994,

30). In South Africa, personal names have been used to keep history and protest politically (Herbert 1999). One important function is observed across cultures; “personal names symbolize individuals’ identities” (Alford 1988, 51). Isaacs notes that “the personal name remains primarily the symbol of the single and unique person” (1975, 75). Because of this close tie between personal name and identity, changing personal names has a significant effect on the person in question. As Alford points out, “name changes are more than linguistic markers of changes in identity;” they “actually help to effect identity change” (1988, 85).

Japanese teachers leading the true name movement believed in the primary importance of one’s personal name in one’s identity. They thus encouraged and sometimes pushed Korean children to use their true personal names to show their true identities. For the children, this was a difficult choice because a name change meant their identity changed. Still, the teachers succeeded in convincing some to start using their Korean names. For other Korean children, their Japanese names remained their true personal names; their surnames, which their parents also used, symbolized their family membership and their first names, their uniqueness as individuals. The question arises: how did resident Koreans identify themselves ethnically when using Japanese names?

This question takes us to another function of personal names. Personal names “usually serve as badges of the basic group identity” (Isaacs 1975). Hence, personal names can contribute to the persistence of ethnicity. For example, Hopi parents try to maintain their children’s Hopi identity through preserving the tradition of naming (Rymes 1996, 242). Afro-Panamanians try to keep their ethnicity by using in local context their Creole-derived ethnic names instead of their Spanish-derived official names (Aceto 2002). Naming can also be deployed by policymakers as a means to assimilate and control ethnic groups. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, Ashkenazic Jews were legally forced to

discard their Hebrew-based names and adopt names appropriate in local languages. The acceptance of a dominant naming practice, however, does not necessarily indicate willingness to assimilate. In the Americas, "name changes may have been preferred by Jews not so much to assimilate . . . but to hide their ethnicity from non-Jews (585). The "de-ethnicizing" of their names may be "a means of cultural maintenance achieved via the strategies of secrecy and concealment" (585).

In the context of postwar Japan, when the state sought to create the facade of ethnic homogeneity, the majority of resident Koreans maintained their ethnic consciousness by de-ethnicizing and *japanizing* their names. They usually kept some traces of their Korean names in adopting Japanese-style names and expressed their Koreanness in subdued ways. Most Korean activists were critical of such practices. Precisely because the imposition of Japanese names was the most salient control mechanism of the Japanese state, they viewed the use of Korean names as the crucial first step in political insurrection, whether they were demanding civil rights or asserting their political tie with the Korean homeland. Although "ethnic names comprise one component of ethnicity, as would language, ancestry, religious customs, food traditions, etc." (Aceto 2002, 579), most activists saw Korean names as the prime ethnic marker in the absence of visible differences between Koreans and Japanese. Japanese teachers involved in the true name movement respected the Korean activists' view. The teachers encouraged their Korean students to declare their true names and true ethnicity, often without understanding the complexity of naming practices and identifications among non-activist Koreans.

In understanding the use of Japanese names among Koreans, a distinction between "pseudonyms" and "false names" is an important one. According to Aceto (2002), pseudonyms are "taken on consciously and explicitly as a kind of name change (legal or otherwise), with little or no

effort to deny the individual's original name, even if the original name is rarely referred to" (583). By contrast, with the use of a false name, an individual attempts to "maintain a new identity through the creation of a new name, while seeking to deny any historical connection to the previous name and its corresponding identity" (584). Some Koreans used Japanese names as pseudonyms to cope with social discrimination while maintaining Korean identity. Some used Japanese names as false names in attempting to pass completely as Japanese and to erase connections to their Korean background.⁶ However, in the true name movement, the use of Japanese names by Koreans was categorically seen as false. This assumption was problematic not only when Korean children were using their Japanese names as pseudonyms but also when they were emotionally attached to their Japanese names and perceived those names as their true names.

What is ethnicity? In the literature of ethnicity, there was a debate in the 1970s between primordialists and instrumentalists. The debate has been resolved by constructionists, who have argued that "ethnic claims and sentiments and ethnic stereotypes are not only constructed but also naturalized and essentialized" (Tambiah 1996, 140). A critical point in this argument is that people in the streets tend to see ethnicity as essentialized and primordial. Korean activists and Japanese teachers held such a view, even when their approach to naming was instrumental. Assuming that self was inherently ethnic, they encouraged Korean children to reveal their ethnicity and their true selves by using their true names. For the activists and teachers, a personal name, an ethnic identity, and the true self signified one another.

Erased in the essentialist view of ethnicity is not only the historical process of constructing ethnicity but also the relational nature of it. Comaroff (1987) states that "ethnicity has its origins in the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy" (307) and "its genesis in specific historical forces, forces which are

simultaneously structural and cultural" (302). Studies on the concept of whiteness address such an asymmetrical power relation in respect to race and the privilege of the majority group (see Hage 2000 for example). In the true name movement, a colonial historical account was given, but the problem of power inequality between the two ethnicities or the co-constitutive nature of the boundaries of those ethnicities was rarely addressed. The privilege of Japanese ethnicity was not recognized.

These problems around the concept of ethnicity were discerned only by targets of the movement, Korean children. Korean children in the 1960s and 1970s had to focus on dealing with harsh discrimination. But Korean children growing up in the 1980s and 1990s with much less exposure to discrimination no longer saw their ethnicity simply as a stigma in itself. They were ready to see it in relational terms and to perceive the privilege of Japanese ethnicity over their own.

Assimilationist Policy and Naming Practices in Postwar Japan

After the end of the Pacific War, the Koreans who remained in Japan lost Japanese nationality and legally became "foreigners," regardless of their place of birth, and were without entitlement to permanent residency. Placed under the control of the Alien Registration Law (ARL) and the Immigration Law, about 600,000 Koreans were made to carry their alien registration cards everywhere they went. The Japanese government maintained an assimilationist policy in dealing with Koreans, routinely requesting them to insert Japanese names in their alien registration cards in addition to their Korean names, and indirectly encouraging them to use the Japanese names in their daily lives. The ARL did not specifically mention the use of Japanese names, but the central government directed local governments using the forms of notifications to include Japanese names on alien registration

cards, and to treat the Japanese names as legally effective for schooling, employment, business licensing and the like. The Japanese government also controlled the ways in which Korean names were written and read. It did not allow the use of Korean characters, though it permitted the use of Roman alphabets. It unofficially imposed the use of Chinese characters and Japanese syllabaries for writing Korean names and automatically adopted the Japanese way of reading Chinese characters unless the Korean way was specifically requested (Ijichi 1994, 23-34).

Even after the liberation of Korea, most Koreans in Japan continued to use Japanese names in everyday life not only because of the state's assimilationist policy but because of the ideology of monoethnicity. Many Japanese excluded Koreans from mainstream society, refusing to offer jobs or housings to them. Struggling just to survive in such a social climate, the Koreans avoided going through the trouble of changing their real-estate registrations or business licenses, which had been issued to them under their Japanese names (Ijichi 1994, 19). Hence, it was customary for most Koreans in Japan to have two names: a Korean name, which was their legal name, and a Japanese name.

Yet, many Koreans did wish to raise their children as Korean, and they tried to do so. As soon as they were liberated, they eagerly sought to provide ethnic education for younger generations and opened Korean language schools. As a result of their enthusiastic educational movement, there were 44,000 Korean students enrolled in about 550 schools (elementary, junior high, high, and youth schools) within a year after the end of the war (Lee 1981, 163-66; Ozawa 1973, 177-205). It goes without saying that those Korean children were using their Korean names.

However, this separatist educational movement came under attack in 1948, when the Japanese government demanded that, to be accredited, Korean schools should comply with the Japanese legal standards.⁷ Japanese should be

the language of instruction and Korean would be taught only in extracurricular courses. The Koreans strongly protested against this measure and resisted the government's move to close non-accredited Korean schools. Yet, the government enforced the closure of Korean schools with armed police force, arresting thousands of Korean protesters. The number of Korean schools had dropped to 154 by 1952, when the U.S. Occupation of Japan ended (Lee 1981, 163-66; Ozawa 1973, 262-85).

After 1952, the Japanese government refused financial responsibility for Koreans, who were no longer Japanese nationals, and made it clear that it would admit Korean children in public schools only if they agreed to receive the education prescribed for Japanese children by the Ministry of Education (Lee 1981, 167). In accordance with this stance, local schools generally adhered to the practical guideline of "treating Korean children in the same way as Japanese children," assimilating the Koreans culturally and teaching them to "live like Japanese" (Inagaki 2001, 75). The schools routinely imposed the use of Japanese names on Korean children through the manipulation of school application forms and the control of information on their true names. The regional boards of education under the control of the Ministry of Education monopolized this information and rarely shared it with school teachers. Unless Korean children expressed their ethnicity themselves, the teachers could not know that they were Korean (Ichiji 1994, 51). Moreover, pointing to the possibility of discrimination, school administrators and teachers recommended to Korean parents that their children use Japanese names and pass as Japanese at school. Assimilationist education and *sôshikaimai* from the colonial period thus made a comeback, only in a less formal manner. The true name movement was a challenge to this assimilationism.

Korean schools began to reemerge in the late 1950s as Chongryun (the General Association of Korean Residents in

Japan) opened schools with funds from North Korea. By the early 1970s, it had established 180 schools of various levels with almost 35,000 students. On a much smaller scale, Mindan (the Korean Residents Union in Japan), which was affiliated with South Korea, also created schools for Korean children (Lee 1981, 168-69; Hicks 1997, 31). However, the majority of Koreans could not send their children to those schools because of relatively high tuition and limited school locations. The presence of Korean children in Japanese schools became an undeniable fact after 1965, when the Republic of Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty acknowledged the rights of Koreans to receive education in the Japanese public school system, endorsing assimilationist education and discouraging education in Korean schools (Ozawa 1973, 468).⁸ At the beginning of the 1970s, when the true name movement emerged, more than three quarters of school-age Korean children, numbering about 125,000, were enrolled in Japanese schools (Rohlen 1981, 185). The true name movement was aimed at helping those children use their Korean names.

The Rokuchû Graduation Ceremony in 1969

Rokuchû, the Sixth Junior High School of Takatsuki City, was widely known to Japanese teachers concerned about Korean children because of its 1969 graduation ceremony. At the ceremony, twelve graduating Koreans let their teachers call them by their Korean names, challenging the common practice of using Japanese names for Koreans in public schools. As several Japanese representatives of the graduating class called for the elimination of discrimination against Koreans, a Korean representative appealed to Japanese students: "You are our brothers and sisters. Let us fight together against discrimination!" (*Asahi Guraifu* 25 April 1969).

Many people learned about this dramatic event through a special issue of the nation-wide magazine *Asahi Guraifu*, which featured the 1968 double homicide by Kim Hi-

lo, a resident Korean. After killing two men, he was besieged at an inn with a dozen Japanese as hostages. In his negotiation with the police, he accused Japanese society of having treated him and his family with contempt because of their Korean background (Lee and De Vos 1981, 252-76). In the magazine, the Rokuchû graduation ceremony was highlighted as a case of young Koreans combating ethnic discrimination rampant in Japanese society. This event impressed many teachers and significantly contributed to the rise of the true name movement. It also had a great impact on many young Koreans, who were afraid to use Korean names because of the strong social stigma attached to Korean ethnicity.⁹

At Rokuchû, the use of Korean names at the ceremony was significant for all the students and teachers who prepared the ceremony. It was a way to demonstrate the "Rokuchû spirit," i.e., a willingness to unite to eliminate all kinds of social discrimination: discrimination against Koreans, *burakumin* 'former outcastes,' the poor, people with disability, and people with less-than-average intellectual competence. The concept of *ningen* 'human being' was the common denominator that would unify all the discriminated people as well as those who were willing to join them in fighting against discrimination. This concept became central to modern Japanese school education in the late 1960s. It was used to teach moral values in connection with the concept of human right, and was also used to encourage children to develop their natural talents and abilities (Inoue 2001, 169-70, 203-04). At Rokuchû, students learned that they must unite as the same *ningen* to eliminate social discrimination.¹⁰

Behind the Rokuchû movement were the efforts of some dedicated Japanese teachers at this school, which was attended by about thirty Korean pupils living in Nariai, a poverty-stricken district. Influenced by the leftist students' movement of the early 1960s,¹¹ those educators were committed to teaching their students critical thinking skills, and they had them think about environmental pollution and

the Vietnam War. The teachers paid special attention to ethnic discrimination against Koreans because they, as Japanese citizens, felt responsible for the colonization of Korea. They appreciated the idea of liberation education, developed by *burakumin* activists; they tried “to re-engineer classroom relations so that children subject to discrimination would be at the center of activities rather than being banished to the periphery” (Fukuoka 2000, 63). When a Korean student at Rokuchû was sent to a reformatory in 1966, they taught their students how to take a political action for him. All the students united behind him and succeeded in taking him out of the reformatory (ZCK 1984, 73).

The teachers at Rokuchû understood Korean ethnicity as a struggle with ethnic discrimination because that was how the Korean students primarily experienced their ethnicity. The teachers learned about their ethnic consciousness by reading their personal accounts of their daily lives and visiting their houses to talk to their families. In encouraging Korean students to fight against ethnic discrimination, the teachers interpreted Korean ethnicity as political. Yet, they also conceived Korean ethnicity as something primordial to *ningen*, which should not be hidden, but expressed. The teachers figured that Korean students were hiding their true *ningen* quality, i.e., their ethnic identity, by using Japanese names as false names. The teachers hence valued the use of *honmyô* ‘true name’ both as an instrument for combating ethnic discrimination and as an expression of being *ningen* (ZCK 1990, 95-107).

In daily activities, the teachers sought to build trust among classmates through discussions and exchanges of group diaries. After building trust, the teachers encouraged Korean students to perform *chôsenjin sengen* ‘declaration of being Korean’ in front of their classmates and express their commitment to fight against discrimination. Modeled on *burakumin sengen* ‘declaration of being *burakumin*,’ the idea of *chôsenjin sengen* was conceived and acted out at Rokuchû as

early as 1964 (Kôdôkyô 1991). As we will see below, the expression was changed to *honmyô sengen* 'declaration of true name' with the rise of the true name movement. In those ritual-like events, Korean children disclosed their true ethnic identity, declared their true names, and showed ethnic pride. In doing so, they followed the teachers' interpretations of Korean ethnicity and the true name.

The teachers and students collaboratively decided on the use of true name at the graduation ceremony, but the latter took the initiative in planning the ceremony. Learning from the teachers how to organize, or *orugu-suru*, older students, both Koreans and Japanese, visited all the lower grade classrooms to persuade their juniors not to laugh upon hearing Korean names, which would sound funny to Japanese speakers.¹² The declaration of Korean names at the graduation ceremony was thus brought about successfully because of the team work of Korean and Japanese students. The role of the teachers was to facilitate the students' collaboration and activism.

The 1969 graduation ceremony at Rokuchû provided teachers in other schools with a model for dealing with Korean naming practices (Kôdôkyô 1991, 37). This model had a few components: teaching Korean students to declare their true ethnic identity and true names and to fight against ethnic discrimination; teaching Japanese students to support Korean students in coming out; and staging a true-name declaration on a public occasion such as a graduation ceremony. After 1969, the use of true names continued to play an important role in the education of Korean children in Takatsuki. However, an emphasis on the use of true names was criticized as perfunctory by some local Korean activists, who stressed the importance of a commitment to fighting discrimination, rather than to the use of true names per se. Such being the case, the use of true names did not become an indispensable component in the education of Koreans in Takatsuki. It was liberal teachers in Osaka City who, inspired by the Rokuchû

movement and motivated by their own political commitment, started the true name movement. The Rokuchû model was kept alive in their activism.

ZOK and the Rise of the True Name Movement

In Osaka City, leftist teachers raised concerns about education for Korean children in public schools as early as the late 1950s (Sugitani 1981). The City's Teachers' Union recognized the need of ethnic studies education for Koreans and discussed an alternative model to assimilationist education. Until the end of the 1960s, however, this model was hardly implemented. The basic stance of the Teachers' Union was that their responsibility was to send Korean children to Korean schools. The union members thought that they could provide leftist education but not ethnic studies education for Koreans (Ichikawa 2001, 63; Inagaki 2001, 82).

In 1965, when it became clear that Korean children were to stay in public schools, Osaka City established the City Research Council of Foreign Children's Educational Problems. However, the council came under severe criticism in 1971, when an official report revealed that council members had discriminatory attitudes toward Koreans (Sugitani 1981, 31). This incident triggered the creation of the Club for Thinking about Education for Korean Children Enrolled in Public Schools (Zenchôkyô Osaka Kangaeru-kai, ZOK). This activist organization developed the Rokuchû model into the true name movement. ZOK has been the prime mover of the movement in the Osaka metropolis to this day.¹³

At the first meeting, attended by 350 educators of various fields from Osaka City and nearby regions, including Takatsuki, the executive committee of ZOK presented a few key ideas for its activism. First, the committee held Japanese people responsible for the ethnic studies education of Korean children. The Koreans were facing difficulties in public schools because of the colonization of Korea, postwar Korea-Japan political relations, and assimilationist educational

policy. Second, the committee appreciated the idea of liberation education. ZOK would seek to liberate both Korean and Japanese children from the evil of ethnic discrimination and to turn them into human beings, *ningen*. Third, as evident in the title of the report of the first meeting, "Children Living with Two Names," ZOK committee members were particularly concerned about the use of Japanese names prevalent among Korean students. Seeing it as a legacy of colonialism and *sôshikaimai*, they believed that ZOK should not allow it to continue (Ichikawa 2001, 66-67). The use of true names, *honmyô*, was a matter of the utmost importance to them.

By 1972, the true name movement had become central to ZOK activism (Sugitani 1981, 21). The movement was twofold: negotiating with policymakers and dealing with students at school, both Koreans and Japanese. ZOK members sought to stop the public school system from encouraging Korean children to use Japanese names. In 1974, ZOK succeeded in persuading the Osaka City Board of Education to issue a notification that true names should be used in school official documents with additional notes on how to read the names in Korean (Inagaki 2001, 82). This did not automatically mean that Korean names were used in daily school life, but now teachers were informed of which pupils were Korean. ZOK also successfully convinced public high schools in Osaka City to make it a rule to ask entering students if they wanted to use their true names. Without such a question, they were likely to use their Japanese names.

At school, ZOK members tried to teach Korean children to develop pride in being Korean and declare their true names.¹⁴ For the members, the true name declaration was extremely important and the disclosure of one's Korean background alone was not acceptable. They thought that the use of true names should be two-way. Hence, their movement was the "movement of calling and declaring true names." They thought that Japanese children should call their Korean

classmates by their Korean names and should support Korean children in using their true names. The teachers tried hard to create classroom and school climates conducive to the use of Korean names by “teaching Korea correctly,” i.e. teaching about the Japanese imperialist invasion of Korea and Korea’s positive influence on Japan (Ichikawa 2001, 66-67). Believing that Japanese educators should take the initiative in calling Koreans by their true names, some schools made it a rule to call all the Korean children by their true names (*Mukuge* 30 Apr. 1976).

ZOK members enthusiastically discussed the concept of true name.¹⁵ They thought that “a name signified its bearer’s face and life.” They tried to pronounce Korean names correctly with the Korean pronunciation (Ichikawa 2001, 67). For them, one’s face and life meant *ningen*. Following the discourse of liberation education, the members thought that Korean children were situated in a state of oppression, instead of that of *ningen*, and that the children could start “moving toward rebirth as *ningen*” by using their true names (*Mukuge* 30 Apr. 1976). They wanted Korean children to use their true names not only because they thought the children should live as *ningen*, but also because they thought the true name could be “a weapon for the children in fighting discrimination” (*Mukuge* 31 Jul. 1975).¹⁶ ZOK members assumed ethnicity as natural to the human existence and equated ethnicity with *ningen*.¹⁷ Thus, for them, the true name signified the true self, or *ningen*, as well as ethnic identity.

ZOK teachers struggled to achieve their goals. Some Korean students complained about the imposition of the use of Korean names; they were offended and irritated by the teachers who used their Korean names in class against their will (Inagaki 2001, 84-85). However, it was also true that ZOK teachers inspired many Korean children to have pride in their Korean ethnicity, declare their true names, and start combating ethnic discrimination. To illustrate, a sixth grader declared his true name in front of all the teachers and

schoolmates and claimed “to retrieve the history, language, and name that Japanese people took away from us” (*Mukuge* 25 May 1975). Another sixth grader asserted to teachers that both Japanese and Koreans should graduate as *ningen* (*Mukuge* 30 Sep. 1976). A high-school student decided to stop living as a “false Japanese person” and “return to his self as a Korean” (*Mukuge* 30 Apr. 1976; 26 Dec. 1977). As these examples demonstrated, when choosing to disclose their ethnicity, Korean children’s narratives were in line with the ZOK discourse. For them too, the true name represented the true self and the true self was an ethnic self.¹⁸

The true name movement was obstructed by those who facilitated the use of Japanese names: this included central and regional governments; most Korean parents who hoped their children would not be discriminated against,¹⁹ many Japanese teachers who did not care about Korean children; and, finally, those Japanese teachers who believed that they should follow the requests of Korean parents (*Mukuge* 1 Sep. 1973). The latter type of teachers was particularly problematic to the movement. Although they looked as if they were giving freedom to Korean students to choose between Korean and Japanese names, they were actually letting the students choose Japanese names (*Mukuge* 11 Mar. 1976). Indeed, ZOK members were a small minority group among those engaged in education in the Osaka metropolis. Their ideal was “not criticized as unattractive but rather as unrealistic” (Rohlen 1981, 191).

However, ZOK members were not discouraged about the true name movement. They received a strong support from Korean activists and some Korean parents (*Mukuge* 15 Sep. 1974).²⁰ Indeed, the situation in Osaka City was conducive to the movement. The city was home to the largest Korean community in Japan.²¹ and was the central site of the 1948 demonstrations for saving Korean schools. The cultural and political presence of Koreans was clear in this city. In the beginning of the 1970s, about 5% of the children enrolled in

elementary and junior-high schools were Koreans, and the enrollment rate was more than 20% in dozens of schools, including one with more than 50% (Ichikawa 2001, 69-70). Starting in 1972, ZOK teachers in cooperation with Korean activists succeeded in opening extracurricular ethnic studies classes in public schools for those Korean children (Inagaki 2001, 81).²² As activist Korean lecturers supported ZOK teachers in spreading the use of true names, the latter pushed policymakers to increase the number of ethnic studies classes, asserting that Korean children had the right to receive education about their ethnicity.

Thus, the true name movement started with the establishment of ZOK, whose core members worked in Osaka City but whose other members came from various cities of Osaka Prefecture including Takatsuki. ZOK's approach did not differ significantly from the Rokuchû model, but ZOK members expanded on the model. They made a clearer link between the colonial naming policy of *sôshikaimai* and the naming practice of Korean children in the postwar public school system. They tried to teach this historical link with the slogan, "teaching Korea correctly." They also tried actively to change the assimilationist education system by negotiating with policymakers. In this effort, they came up with the idea of Korean children's right to receive ethnic studies education. Third, they defined the meaning of true name in clearer terms and articulated the importance of the use of true names. In their rhetoric, a personal name, an ethnic self, and the true self, or *ningen*, signified one another.

As it spread beyond Takatsuki and Osaka Cities, the true name movement was carried out in different ways by different teachers. Yet, the Rokuchû model and ZOK's approach were appreciated in the movement. As we will see below, many of the teachers who joined the movement in the 1980s and 1990s took some basic ideas from these two models and came up with schematized versions of the old models.

Zenchôkyô and the Spread of the True Name Movement

In this section, I will discuss, in general terms, the spread of the true name movement and social changes surrounding resident Koreans in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1979, ZOK decided to collaborate with educators in other regions of Japan and held the first nationwide meeting on education for Korean children in public schools (Sugitani 1981, 27). The meeting attracted 500 people and rejuvenated ZOK activism and the true name movement. This initiative led to the formation of Zenchôkyô (Association for the Study of Resident Korean Education) in 1983.²³ This nationwide umbrella association of regional groups interested in the education of Korean children, including ZOK, played a leading role in spreading the true name movement. The rise of minority politics in the 1980s helped Zenchôkyô start and expand the movement. For example, Ainu people began a politics of difference and challenged the myth of monoethnicity (see Siddle 1996). Naturalized Koreans who adopted Japanese names at the time of naturalization fought legal battles to reclaim their Korean names (Hicks 1997, 76-82).²⁴ In the new phase, the discourse and practice of the true name movement did not change significantly from the 1970s, partly because ZOK core members took the leadership of Zenchôkyô until 1994.²⁵ However, new tendencies emerged as more teachers joined the movement.

In analyzing Zenchôkyô reports published between 1980 and 2003, Kishida (2004) identified three kinds of rhetoric on ethnic studies education for Korean children in public schools: a minority rights thesis, a responsibility thesis, and an education thesis. For some teachers, ethnic studies education was the human right of an ethnic minority group. The ethnic way of living was "natural" or "true" and should be taught to Korean children (45). Some approached ethnic studies education with a sense of responsibility for Japan's

colonization of Korea and assimilationist policy. Other teachers regarded the role of ethnic studies education as instrumental in achieving their ultimate goal of education, the development of a healthy personality as a human being as stated in the Basic Law of Education. Ascribing all the problems of Korean children, real or imagined, to their ethnicity, this last group of teachers believed that Korean children needed to develop ethnic pride in order to solve their problems. The more they were convinced of the existence of ethnic discrimination, the more surely they regarded the development of ethnic pride as indispensable for Koreans to develop a healthy personality (53).

In reality, Zenchôkyô teachers were not divided into three groups, but they placed varying degrees of emphasis on the three theses. ZOK core members considered all the theses to be equally important. The Zenchôkyô teachers as a whole tended to focus on the education thesis. This was probably because they approached their Korean students primarily as educators, not as activists, and concentrated on the development of *ningen* (Kishida 2004, 56).²⁶

The contents of the education thesis varied among individual teachers, but many followed what Kuraishi (2000) called a “master narrative.” In his analysis of Zenchôkyô reports as narratives, he identified a recurring pattern, i.e., a master narrative. This narrative starts with a Korean child who has a negative perception of her ethnicity and hides it by using a Japanese name. Then she meets a teacher who educates her about Korean ethnicity. The narrative ends with the child’s performing *honmyô sengen* ‘declaration of true name’ and becoming *ningen* (43). Some teachers were apt to follow the scheme of the master narrative in dealing with Korean students, instead of trying to understand their lived experiences. Kuraishi continued to say that as the master narrative spread, there emerged a narrative with a reversed story line, in which a Korean child was expected to become *ningen* before declaring his true name (43). In this reversed

narrative, a Korean has to develop a fine character and become *ningen* before showing ethnic pride. In this way, for some teachers, ethnicity became a prestigious property of selected individuals (48-51, 76). Both in the master narrative and the reversal narrative, however, ethnicity was equated with *ningen* and seen as fundamental to the human existence. A Korean student was expected to become both *ningen* and an ethnic self at the end, whichever she would achieve first. In both narratives, the student was expected to perform *honmyô sengen*, reflecting an influence from the Rokuchû model and ZOK's emphasis on the concept of *honmyô*.

The master narrative and its reversal emerged because teachers developed preconceptions from reading accumulated narratives of their seniors' teaching practices. Old-timer ZOK members and Rokuchû teachers started from scratch in dealing with Korean children and made efforts to understand their lived experiences, including their concrete experiences of discrimination. In trying to learn from their seniors, newer generations of teachers tended to approach Korean ethnicity and true name conceptually. It was probably those teachers with such an inclination that Korean lecturers found "naively ignorant" and hence problematic (Nakajima 2004, 19). As Lee (2004) argued, these teachers, without fully understanding why Koreans had two names, simply regarded the use of Japanese names among Koreans "as a symbol of discrimination" and dealt with their Korean students accordingly (75).

The reliance on schematized narratives was problematic not merely because teachers approached their students with preconceptions, but more importantly because teachers applied their seniors' old ideas to new generations of Korean children. The ethnic experiences of those third- or fourth-generation Korean children were increasingly becoming what Gans (1979) called "symbolic ethnicity." Young Koreans were losing an objective grounding for their ethnicity and were getting more immersed in Japanese

culture, even when they lived in Korean districts. They were also experiencing less ethnic discrimination because of legal and social changes. In the 1980s, the Japanese government stopped treating the resident Koreans as sojourners and established them as permanent residents. Meanwhile, Korean activists orchestrated the civil rights movement and opened up some job opportunities for Koreans. In 1993, the fingerprinting requirement, which was humiliating to many Koreans, was eliminated from the alien registration system. In the cultural sphere, the 1988 Seoul Olympics Games helped improve the image of Korea among Japanese people. In Osaka, Korean parents wanted to revitalize their ethnic culture and became more interested in sending their children to ethnic studies classes, causing a shortage of Korean lecturers. In the 1990s, South Korean popular culture began to attract Japanese people. Moreover, the idea of multiculturalism emerged as a guiding principle for educators and regional administrators in dealing with children of foreign descent, whose number had increased in the 1990s.²⁷ These changes contributed to some reduction of discrimination against Koreans. The education thesis, which was based on the assumption of ethnic discrimination, was still applicable to many Korean children, but not to all.

The perception of the use of Japanese names among Koreans also changed over time. As Kim (1978) already noticed in the 1970s, many Koreans immersed in Japanese cultural customs came to take it for granted that they should use Japanese names. Hence, it was not discrimination or prejudice alone, he argued, that hindered Koreans from using their true names. Korean naming practice was “full of contradiction,” encompassing personal, historical, and political issues (220). Concurring with Kim a few decades later, Lee (2004) pointed out that for many Koreans, “their Japanese names were no longer detachable from their personal identities,” and not necessarily indicating “the tool of the Japanese control” (70). They became increasingly oblivious to

the political and historical significance of the use of Japanese names as they developed emotional attachments to their Japanese names, which were their *najinda* 'familiar' names (70). There emerged a tendency among young Koreans to feel that their Japanese names were their true names. A study conducted in the Osaka metropolis in 1989 found that about three-fifths of the Koreans using Japanese names did so because they simply did not feel any necessity to use their Korean names (Inatomi 1992, 154). Contrary to Zenchôkyô teachers' claim, many Koreans did not see their Japanese names as false names.

The attenuation of discrimination against Koreans also helped some Korean children realize that they were using Japanese names for convenience, i.e., as pseudonyms, not as false names. They were conscious that their Korean names were their true names, even when they held emotional attachments to their Japanese names. Students of this type began to take the initiative in performing *honmyô sengen* in response to social changes in the late 1980s (Lee 2004, 68). In her analysis of Zenchôkyô reports, Lee (2004) identified three kinds of agents for initiating the use of true names: schools, teachers, and students. The student-initiated pattern started to increase after 1992. Teachers were apt to be perplexed with student-initiated *honmyô sengen* because they assumed that all the Koreans wanted to hide their ethnicity. Some teachers even felt frightened by student-initiated *honmyô sengen*, probably because their assumptions were challenged (69). For example, in a 1984 case from Osaka, a teacher stopped a high-school student from performing *honmyô sengen*, arguing that neither he nor his class had learned enough about Korea and they were not prepared for it. In analyzing this case, Lee pointed out that the teacher approached the student with the preconception that *honmyô sengen* meant an expression of the determination to fight ethnic discrimination. For the student, it only meant a way to express himself as a person (Lee 2004, 73). Lee added that, living in a society that imposed the use of

Japanese names, young Koreans had to “make a decision on their naming practice at one point to move on to a next phase of life, whether or not they were ready to fight discrimination and live with ethnic pride” (74). The naming practices of young Koreans were complex and diverse and could not be reduced to any simple narrative or teaching approach that many Zenchôkyô teachers relied on.

To be sure, diversity among Korean children in dealing with their names existed in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, they held similar perceptions of ethnic discrimination. They differed in their ways of coping with it through their naming practices. The social changes I have discussed above brought about more diversity among Koreans not only in their responses to ethnic discrimination but also in their perceptions of it.

The nature of the true name movement was affected by the involvement of regional administrations for foreign children’s education. In the 1980s, regional boards of education in Osaka Prefecture, pressured by Korean activists and concerned Japanese teachers, began to acknowledge the importance of ethnic studies education for Koreans by establishing guiding principles and financing such education. As early as 1982, Takatsuki City created “the Basic Guideline of Education for Resident Foreigners of Takatsuki City.” ZOK, in cooperation with *burakumin* activists, succeeded in leading Osaka Prefecture to establish “the Basic Guideline of Education for Resident Foreigners” in 1988.²⁸ Many other cities in the Osaka metropolis such as Yao and Sakai followed suit. A couple of legal actions taken by the Japanese government facilitated the creation of education guidelines for foreign children. It ratified “the Convention on the Rights of the Child” in 1994 and created “the Law on the Promotion of Human Rights Education and Awareness-Raising” in 2000. Most of those education guidelines discussed the importance of the use of true names and some cities created teaching materials on this topic. In 1997, the Osaka City Board of Education issued the guide book “To Promote the Teaching

Practice on True Names.” After providing the historical background of Korean naming practices, it delineated in detail how to promote the use of true names among Korean children at each grade level from kindergarten to high school, including advice on how to approach parents and what to do for entrance and graduation ceremonies. In 2002, Higashi Osaka City published a similar booklet entitled “To Live with the ‘True Name’!” Itami City created a handbook in 1995 for foreign children’s education, which devoted one third of the pages to a discussion of the use of true names. In the 1990s, it was no longer a handful of dedicated teachers who asserted the use of true names, but any teacher in Osaka was conscious of the issue, if not concerned about it.

The involvement of regional administrations in the education of Korean children facilitated the true name movement, but only in a limited way. For one thing, it produced teachers who simply tried to follow education guidelines or who were those discussed above as naively ignorant. Held accountable for how they implemented education guidelines, school administrators paid attention to statistics on how many Korean children used their true names, instead of evaluating the quality of teaching. For another, by the time that support came from regional administrations for the use of true names, most Korean children had become deeply attached to their Japanese names. That made the spread of the use of true names more difficult than before.

To sum up, in the 1980s and 1990s, the true name movement was led by Zenchôkyô, and was spread beyond the small groups of teachers in Takatsuki and Osaka Cities. During this period, teachers’ approaches to the use of true names remained basically the same as before. But there emerged tendencies to follow conventional narratives and guidelines. Those teachers who had such tendencies did not look into the complex lived experiences of Korean children, assuming that the children were using Japanese names as false names to hide their true ethnic identity because of

discrimination. This assumption reflected the lives of many Korean children growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, but it was applicable to an increasingly smaller number of Korean children in the 1980s and 1990s. It is not surprising that teachers' attempt to persuade Korean children to declare their Korean names brought about diverse results.

To shed light on different effects of the true name movement on Korean children, let us examine the teaching practice of one Zenchôkyô teacher. He was influential in spreading the true name movement in the 1990s.

Honmyô Sengen

Fujiwara Shirô joined the executive committee of Zenchôkyô in 1983 and served as the director between 1994 and 2004. During that decade, he made "calling and declaring the true name" as the central principle of Zenchôkyô, just as his predecessors had (Fujiwara 2005). He developed an approach which was schematized and was well in line with the master narrative Kuraishi (2000) discussed. He shared his approach with Zenchôkyô teachers through books and articles. It was not very different from other teachers' approaches, except for his particularly strong emphasis on *honmyô sengen*.

In his approach, Fujiwara began by teaching the historical context of Koreans' naming practices, focusing on *sôshikaiimei* (1995, 13). He also taught how the current Japanese society pressured Koreans to hide their true selves. He then tried to generate support among Japanese students for Korean students through classroom discussions. Calling their Japanese names "false names," he urged Korean students to stop using those names, start living true lives with true names, and become *ningen*. He pushed the Korean students to perform *honmyô sengen* in front of class and then at a school-wide event. The final stage of his approach was to have his Korean students use their true names at graduation ceremonies (60-84).

Fujiwara succeeded in persuading many Korean students to perform *honmyô sengen*. In 1996, his efforts were acknowledged publicly when NHK, the public broadcasting station of Japan, aired a TV documentary entitled "The Unsettled Mind: Between Two Names."²⁹ The documentary focussed on Fujiwara's dealing with two Korean students, demonstrating how one student, Kim, followed his approach and how the other, Shiromoto, rejected it.

In the first case, after going through some struggles, Kim decided to perform *honmyô sengen* at a whole-school special homeroom intended for human rights education. Standing on the stage with her Korean supporters, who were holding their group banners, she started her statement by pronouncing her true name in Korean. She talked about how she had been ashamed of her Korean background and then stated: "Starting today, I will live as the true self using my true name instead of as the false self known as Murakami." Like many other *honmyô sengen* performers, she was emotionally charged and was sobbing while making this statement. In a later interview, she said with lots of smiles that she felt relieved and was no longer afraid of ethnic discrimination. She attended her commencement ceremony wearing a crimson Korean dress as many of her seniors had done. Joking that she should wear it everyday and receiving congratulatory remarks from her friends and Fujiwara, she looked content with her accomplishments.³⁰

Shiromoto, on the other hand, refused to do *honmyô sengen*. Standing in front of his classmates, all Japanese, he reluctantly stated that he was a resident Korean. Then, he declared that he had no intention of using his true name and challenged the idea of *honmyô sengen*. He accused Fujiwara and his classmates, who joined their teacher in trying to persuade him to use his true name, of not being able to understand his situation in any deep sense or to help him in the real world. He then problematized the practice of singling out Korean students, asking why they had to be treated as

“special” and expressing his desire to be treated as “normal.” He also complained that he was coerced into admitting his Korean background publicly. One Japanese student took his side, arguing that he should make the decision on his own. Fujiwara accepted the value of choice, but reminded his students of the political significance of Koreans using Japanese names, which he had taught in his history class. Those Japanese names, he argued, were not “nicknames” but were produced historically. Japanese people were responsible for creating the discriminatory social climate that was making Shiromoto use a Japanese name. Fujiwara continued: “I am not asking him to do anything for us, but I am saying that we, as Japanese, have to do what we can do for Koreans.”

Fujiwara’s approach thus produced different effects on different Korean students. Though enthusiastic, he could not capture the minds of all the Korean students at his school; only about a quarter of some thirty Korean students used their true names (Fujiwara 1995, 79). While many Japanese teachers still appreciated his efforts, some Korean activists criticized him for applying one single teaching method to all Korean students without paying attention to individual differences. Those Korean students who continued to use their Japanese names probably had different reasons to do so, but Shiromoto’s reasoning pointed to two fundamental problems in the discourse and practice of the true name movement. Let us examine those problems.

The True Name Movement and its Discontents

The first of the two problems concerns a relation between school and society. After graduating from school, Koreans had to take on the burden of dealing with the real world, where they faced not only psychological discrimination against their ethnicity but also exclusion as foreigners in terms of civil rights. Fujiwara was actually asking a lot from Shiromoto and other Korean students. It is true that it became

easier for resident Koreans to find employment in the 1990s, but they were still pressured to use Japanese names and pass as Japanese. Those students who performed *honmyō sengen* often had to switch back to Japanese names as they entered the workforce.

Many teachers were aware of the first problem. As demonstrated in the case of ZOK members, the teachers did what they could do outside their school work to contribute to changing discriminatory social institutions. They held workshops for the public and supported Korean activists. In cooperation with school administrators, many teachers assisted Korean students in their entry into the workforce, asking prospective employers to provide them with equal access to jobs (Okano 1997, 543). However, those efforts had a limited impact on society. For example, as Okano points out, schools' intervention in employers' recruitment practices "hardly challenges the dominant Japanese *definition* of employment, however arbitrary it may be" (1997, 543, italics in original).

The second problem is the teachers' imposition of their ideas on their students. In the true name movement, teachers routinely stressed the importance of students' initiatives. However, as illustrated in Fujiwara's case, the teachers often ended up imposing their ideas about naming and ethnicity on their students. Korean students who studied with ZOK teachers in early days sometimes criticized the teachers for imposing the use of true names on them (Inagaki 2001, 84-85). They did not want to use their true names, but they were ready to accept the rhetoric of the true name movement because the teachers created it based on their real life experiences. The old rhetoric was not acceptable to many Korean children growing up in the 1990s such as Shiromoto who had different experiences from older generations. They perceived their teachers as imposing the rhetoric on them.³¹

Many teachers were aware of their tendency to impose their own ideas on Korean children and tried not to do so.

However, the teachers, especially those who relied on conventional narratives, rarely knew what exactly they were imposing on their students when they did. Zenchōkyō teachers stressed the use of true names because they understood that choosing not to identify as an ethnic minority meant assimilating as an ethnic Japanese in mainstream Japanese society (Kishida 2004: 56-7). They aimed to debunk this equation of human being and Japanese ethnicity and to redefine Japanese society as multiethnic. However, in doing so, the teachers were inadvertently imposing a rigid system of ethnic classification on Korean children, in which a personal name, an ethnic self, and the true self (or *ningen*) signified one another. Younger generations of Koreans such as Shiromoto, who were more individualistic and more immersed in mainstream culture, had resistance against being treated as members of an ethnic group, as essentialized ethnic beings.³²

In unconsciously imposing a rigid ethnic classification on Korean children, the Japanese teachers were also blind to their privileged ethnic status. They held Japanese people responsible for colonialism, assimilationism, and ethnic discrimination. But the teachers did not see how their majority ethnicity was co-constituted relationally vis-a-vis Korean ethnicity (or other minority ethnicities) and how it was kept as privileged and “unmarked” in everyday life. They did not realize how they were treating Korean ethnicity as “marked” while taking their Japanese ethnicity for granted. As demonstrated in the case of Shiromoto, Korean students often resisted using their Korean names because of the marked nature of Korean ethnicity. They wanted to be treated just like Japanese students were treated, i.e., as unmarked and normal. They wanted to use their Japanese names not simply because of their attachments to those names but because of the unmarked nature of the names. Or rather, they developed the attachments because of that nature. In resisting identity change that would ensue from name change, they were

possibly trying to maintain, not Japanese identity per se, but privilege inherent in this majority identity.

ZOK core members had some sensitivity to the privilege of Japanese people and were careful not to stress the concept of Japanese ethnicity. They believed that they could start talking about it only after eliminating all ethnic discrimination, and stayed critical of those teachers who expressed their pride in Japanese ethnicity (*Mukuge* 30 Jan. 1976). However, the ZOK teachers fell short of realizing how Japanese ethnicity and Korean ethnicity were co-constituted and how Japanese privilege was produced in that process.

The second problem, the imposition of a rigid ethnic classification on minority members and majority privilege associated with this imposition, is difficult to deal with within the public school system, which revolves around the development of Japanese national identity based on essentialism and primordialism. Public school teachers can criticize colonization, assimilation, and ethnic discrimination within the national education system to some extent, but they cannot deconstruct the concept of Japanese identity or problematize Japanese privilege without challenging the whole system.

The examination of the two problems has thus revealed that there were limits to the true name movement and that those limits had to do with the fact that the movement was carried out by teachers in the public school system. Yet, as I discuss below, transformative effects of their teaching could transcend the boundaries of this system.

Conclusion: Effects of the True Name Movement

What has the true name movement accomplished? According to a research study conducted by Osaka City in 2001, only 10.2 % or 23 of 225 children holding Korean nationality used their true names.³³ Most Korean adults used Japanese names situationally or always, and about 68.9 % of

the 560 Korean adults who used Japanese names did so because they had been using those names since their childhood. Only 9.2 % of them pointed to ethnic discrimination as their reason for using Japanese names. Probably influenced by those adults, many Korean children were not interested in using their true names (Osaka City 2002). Statistically speaking, it is difficult to say that the true name movement has been successful.

However, as ZOK members argued in my interviews in 2005, Japanese teachers involved in the movement have inspired a number of Korean children to use their true names, and have empowered many Korean children who would have remained unconfident of themselves if it had not been for that teaching. As the ZOK members stressed, the teachers, to say the least, have provided *kikkake* 'opportunity' for Korean children to start thinking about the cultural and political significance of naming and the politics of ethnic self-positioning. A Korean activist told me that it never occurred to her to use her true name until she met her husband, who was using his true name. In her school days, she took it for granted that Koreans used Japanese names. On the other hand, her husband was exposed to the movement at his schools. He was provided with *kikkake*, which led him to become an ethnic activist.

It is true that many of true-name users in public schools are made to use their true names. However, many young Koreans who have had *kikkake* make their own decisions about their names after getting out of grade school, i.e., getting out of the power-laden relationship of teacher and student. Indeed, the true name movement, in which students' selves are "being-made," according to its rhetoric, can potentially generate "subject-making" in their later lives (see Ong 1996). Those young Koreans, as active agents, explore the performative potential of naming and choose names that fit their hybridized cultural identities. For example, some use a Korean surname with a Japanese first name, hybridizing

names ethnically. There are also those who assert Korean ethnicity while using Japanese names. They are severing the tie between ethnic identity and ethnic naming. In exploring various possibilities for their names, the young Koreans problematize the rigid ethnic classification that underlies both the assimilationist naming policy and the conventional rhetoric of the true name movement. They deploy their hybridized personal names not only to subvert the imposed ethnic classification but also to undermine the essentialized conception of Japanese identity.³⁴ In the final analysis, the true value of the true name movement lies in its attention to the performative potential of personal naming practice.

At the turn of the century, the maintenance of the vigor of the true name movement became increasingly difficult, not because of criticism against it, but because of demographic and legal changes among children of Korean descent. Children holding Korean nationality, primary targets of the movement, began to decrease in number at the beginning of the 1990s because an increasing number of Koreans were becoming naturalized citizens and were marrying Japanese nationals. The reduction of Korean-nationality holders became clearly noticeable toward the end of that decade (see Tai 2004). The movement leaders have begun to stress the inclusion of children of ethnically mixed parentage and those holding Japanese nationality. In this process, however, the rhetoric of the true name movement has been significantly undermined. A personal name does not signify an ethnic name for most naturalized Koreans who have Japanese names as their legal names, and ethnicity is hybridized for children born to intermarriage.

Yet, the true name movement has not died out in the Osaka metropolis. Rather, it has started a new phase.³⁵ Japanese educators and Korean activists cooperated in launching a *honmyô* campaign at the end of the 1990s.³⁶ In 2002, they held the "'Honmyô Campaign' Concert" and celebrated prize winners in a competition of expressing the

importance of true names. In trying to deal with the new situation, Japanese teachers, following Korean activists, have begun to use the word *minzoku-mei* 'ethnic name' in place of the word *honmyô*. They encourage a naturalized child to use the Korean name that his family abandoned in the process of naturalization, and a child of mixed parentage to use a "double name" consisting of the two surnames of her parents.³⁷ In this way, the teachers are modifying the old rhetoric of the true name movement.³⁸ They have already been criticized for imposing a new version of ethnic classification, but their students may be learning the performative potential of personal naming practice.

Notes

1. In this article, I focus on resident Koreans and do not discuss newcomer Koreans who are different from old-comer resident Koreans in naming practices.
2. This is not one united movement, but it refers to a number of movements that are carried out by multiple groups in multiple school districts.
3. By the Osaka metropolis, I include Osaka, Hyogo, Kyoto, and Nara Prefectures.
4. According to Miyata, Kim and Yang (1992), the Japanese state did not impose the adoption of Japanese names legally, but coerced Koreans to apply for it "voluntarily" (ii). *Sôshikaimei* was not merely the change of names but also the change of family systems. Whereas a Japanese surname was shared by all the household members, including wives and adopted children, a Korean surname indicated the patriarchal line of his or her genealogy. Korean women did not change their surnames after marriage and children took their fathers' surnames (41-67).
5. This story is quoted in Ozawa's book.
6. Those Koreans are apt to become naturalized Japanese. Until recently, naturalized citizens were made to use Japanese names as their legal names. See Sugihara (1993).
7. The government acted in accordance with the Supreme Command for Allied Powers.

8. There was a massive demonstration to protest the treaty. The treaty opened up an option for Koreans to receive permanent residency, albeit only by becoming South Korean nationals.

9. For example, a Korean activist told me how he shivered at the news of this event.

10. The concept of *nigen* appeared repeatedly in the 1970s and 1980s in two journals: the school journal of Rokuchû, *Nakama*, and the journal put out by a committee for Korean children's education of the Takatsuki City Board of Education, *Chindarure*.

11. The major struggle of this period was against the Japan – U.S. Security Treaty.

12. The discussion here is based on my interview with one of the teachers who led the movement.

13. This association is usually referred to as Kangaeru-kai, which means a club for thinking. ZOK collaborated with the City's Teachers' Union and the City Research Council of Foreign Children's Education, which was reorganized from the original council.

14. In ZOK newsletters, *Mukuge*, many teachers discussed how they succeeded in convincing their students to begin to use their true names (*Mukuge* 10 Oct. 1972, 1 Sep. 1973, 31 Aug. 1976). I am using the 1981 book *Mukug*, which has the reprints of the newsletters published between 1971 and 1980.

15. ZOK core members shared some ideas about the concept of true name, but participants in ZOK activities had multiple views. Here I discuss the core members' ideas.

16. These ideas were similar to ones held by many Korean educators. For example, Kang (1995: 59) states that "the ultimate goal of ethnic education is to raise children who can declare their 'true' names" and that "the declaration of one's true name means the declaration of one's existence as a Korean and an expression of the determination to live with a pride as a Korean without succumbing to ethnic discrimination."

17. The equation is implied in many statements made by ZOK members in their newsletters *Mukuge* (see *Mukuge* 25 May 1975).

18. The school-wide approach also had success; a high-school student appreciated the discrimination-free climate of her junior-high school, where all the Korean children used their true names and hence she did not have to be conscious of her nationality (*Mukuge* 30 Apr. 1976).

19. According a survey of 1974, as many as 231 families out of 245 preferred the use of Japanese names for their children at school (*Mukuge* 30 Jul. 1976).
20. Some Korean activists were critical of ZOK's stress on the use of true names (*Mukuge* 30 Jul. 1976). However, other Korean activists in Osaka City supported ZOK.
21. In the 1970s, the population was about 120,000, a fifth of the total Korean population in Japan.
22. ZOK members in Osaka City paid more attention to the ethnic culture of Koreans than teachers in other cities, who tended to focus on ethnic discrimination. For a discussion on the origin of ethnic studies classes, see Hester (2000).
23. The full name is Zenkoku zainichi chōsenjin kyōiku kenkyū kyōgikai. The word *gaikokujin* (foreigners) replaced the word *chōsenjin* (Korean) in 2003.
24. There was another kind of activism which problematized the Japanese way of pronouncing Korean names in the media. See Hick (1997, 83-85).
25. ZOK had trouble with some members of Zenchōkyō in 1993 and has been keeping some distance from this association.
26. Kishida uses the term *jinkaku*, a human personality, which is similar to *ningen*. Here I use the latter to be consistent in my word usage. See Inoue (2001) for a discussion on the two terms.
27. The number of foreigners began to increase in the late 1980s as the Japanese industry experienced a labor shortage.
28. Osaka City created its own principle in 2001.
29. The Japanese title was *Yureru kokoro: futatsu no namae no aida de*.
30. Since this practice was criticized as gender-biased, male students began to wear Korean dresses at graduation ceremonies.
31. Though having this perception, Korean students often follow their teachers' rhetoric because of the power difference between teachers and students (Takatsuki Omoni-no-kai 2002).
32. Asked to draw an image of himself in an interview after the above TV documentary, he drew a picture of a basketball. He said that he loved the sport and that the ball symbolized him. He naturalized to Japan about the time he graduated. He declared that Shiromoto was his true name as it became his legal name.
33. The study was conducted by an organization assembled by the city to analyze the lives of foreign nationals for the purpose of policymaking.
34. I plan a separate paper about the identities and naming practices of young Koreans.

35. Many newcomer children, such as Brazilian and Vietnamese children, have begun to use Japanese names because they worry about ethnic discrimination or hope to be treated as normal, i.e., Japanese. The true name movement is becoming important for those children.
36. Those people created Ethnic Studies Education Network (ESEN) in 1998, when they gathered to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 1948 education demonstrations. This network launched the *honmyô* campaign, which was supported by about forty organizations, including regional boards of education and Zenchôkyô, as well as about two thousand individuals.
37. In the 2001 study discussed above, children who used double names made up 3.1 % of the Korean children studied.
38. For example, the issue of naming was discussed at the 2005 Ethnic Studies Education Forum held by ESEN (see note 36). The presenters inquired into the meaning of the true name movement in relation to the increasingly diverse ways of identifying among children of Korean descent. See <http://www.ne.jp/asahi/m-kyouiku/net/2005forum.htm>, accessed on Aug. 29, 2005.

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