

Moral-Allegorical Names in Gracián's *Criticón*

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THE STUDY OF INVENTED LITERARY NAMES has lagged far behind that of toponyms and historical family names, and yet imaginative literature has produced an uncommon number of names which not only achieved extensive common use (especially in the Renaissance) but from time immemorial have formed an important element of literary invention. I am concerned here with the particular case of moral-allegorical names in the foremost didactic work of the Spanish Baroque. They are of interest both because they illustrate a continuing historical phenomenon and because in the day of "mannered" literary techniques they came to be key ingredients in one writer's didacto-literary system.

A. "Agudeza nominal"

As Romera-Navarro has pointed out, the allegorical element is of utmost importance in the *Criticón*.¹ The grand scheme in the work is the voyage of man (Critilo and Andrenio) through life, a voyage complicated by innumerable encounters with personified virtues and vices, as well as with occasional historical personages, that are met on the way. The principals of this allegory and many of the minor actors are typified by invented names: 'honor' is *Honoría*, 'hypocrisy' *Hipocrinda*, etc. The practice of thus highlighting the essential nature of a character, or in this case of personifying man's principal virtues and vices, has been designated as the "only rhetorical device" which can be traced uninterruptedly to Homer,² and Gracián included it as a prime stylistic device in his *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* (1642, 1648).

¹ Miguel Romera-Navarro, *Estudios sobre Gracián* (Austin, 1950), 73: "... [the allegorical element] está en el plan general del *Criticón* como elemento esencial, y está asimismo en un grupo numeroso de episodios como elemento accesorio."

² Gracián worked in a long tradition which stems from antiquity and continues through the Middle Ages. In Homer, we have for Odysseus *Strife* or the *Son of Hard-life Vexation*. Hector is similarly the *Shielder* and *Defender*. The tradition descends

In the *Agudeza* it is demonstrated that this stylistic device will seek not only the absolute creation of names but will, perhaps with preference and more often, adapt names hoary with antiquity, and with or without alteration, will find their "correspondence and correlation" which will make them adaptable to allegorical use.³ Gracián then implies that a higher *agudeza* will be achieved if the name is changed,⁴ that is, if by an alteration of the name (*Roma* reversed, *Amor*, the 'love' of the church), its potential *correspondencia* is more thoroughly plumbed.⁵ Hereby, an infinitude of new meanings may be revealed, and the practice will produce in the *Criticón Andrenio*, which probably combines *Andrés* and *Andronio*, even as it derives from Greek *anēr*, gen. *andros* 'man'; *Sofisbella*,

through Pindar, Aeschylus, and Plato, to the Latins – Quintilian, Cicero, and Vergil – and to the Middle Ages. Augustine answers the question "Why is the apostle of the Gentiles named *Paulus*?" by saying that Paul is "minimus apostolorum;" and more concretely in Cassiodorus: "Etymologia est oratio brevis, per certas associationes ostendens ex quo nomine id quod quaeritur venerit nomen." St. Isidore, of course, elaborately treats the matter (I, 29) and it comes into the Renaissance through Dante to Calderón. See Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1953), 495f.

In Plato, a full-blown discussion of where names come from is offered by Socrates in the *Cratylus*. Socrates holds that the names of persons, if properly understood, that is, not confused by the corruption of words through time, will everywhere emerge from the nature itself of the person. This theory is remarkably similar to what Gracián says in the *Agudeza* (see note 6, "Dios"), and what Rafael Lapesa calls a "capricious etymology" in Isidore ("... dice que al gato se le llamaba *cattus* 'quia cattat, id est, videt,'" *Historia de la lengua española*, [Madrid, 1950], 71) is no more so than those in Plato and finally, even, Aristotle: "... when one says of Draco's Laws that they are those not of man but of a dragon" (quoted by Curtius, *op. cit.*, 495). Closer to Gracián's own day, the matter was again treated at length by Luis de León in *Los nombres de Cristo*, especially in the chapter "Los nombres en general" ("... el nombre es como imagen de la cosa de quien se dice, o la misma cosa disfrazada en otra manera..." *Obras completas*, ed. Felix García [Madrid, 1944], 394). See also my articles, "Onomastic Invention in the *Buscón*," *Hispanic Review* 29 (1961), 15–32, and "Spanish Baroque Parody in Mock Titles and Fictional Names," to appear in *Romance Philology*.

³ *Obras completas* (Madrid, 1944), 182. Compare that, in the *Comulgatorio*, *Joaquín* is "la Preparación de Dios" and *Ana* is "la gracia" (*Obras*, p. 846). *Ana* suggests something quite different to Calderón: "What is the meaning of Marianne? '... tomando a Marte el Mar/Y a Diana el Ana, encierra/El nombre de Mar-y-Ana/Imperiosas excelencias'" (quoted by Curtius, *op. cit.*, 500).

⁴ "... si la cortan o trastruecan..."; *Obras*, 183.

⁵ "... de cada sílaba renace una sutileza ingeniosa y de cada acento un concepto" (*ibid.*).

which fuses Greek *sophía* 'wisdom' with a popular seventeenth-century form of *Isabel*, *Isbella*; *Vegecia* 'Old-age,' which probably harkens back to the likes of the Roman writer *Vegetius* (Sp. *Vegecio*), etc. Even the absolute inventions usually reveal some onomastic element: *Hipocrinda* 'hypocrisy' with the common name-suffix *-inda*, as *Lucinda*; or *Falimundo* 'falseness of the world' or 'world of the false,' but with *mundo* reflecting also the likes of *Rosamunda* and *Segismundo*, the stem, in Gracián, being Latinized in manneristic fashion back to the infinitive *fallere* rather than the participle *falsus*, the usual source of the Spanish derivatives.⁶ The idea of the mystery and hidden meanings of language undoubtedly goes back not only to Homer and Plato but also to the concept of the sacredness of language and the word, and the Jesuit Gracián does not hesitate to attribute to *Dios* his own private interpretation of the exalted term.⁷

B. *Andrenio-Critilo*, Gracián's *Vision of Man Personified*

Like *Crisi*, the chapter title name in the *Criticón*, the name *Critilo* is also derived from the Greek verb *krino*, 'judge.'⁸ Rescuing Andrenio from shipwreck, Critilo is his mentor, his guide, and much more — as we shall see — in the pilgrimage through life. He is, in brief, as his name conveys, the rational part of man, the part which by the divine gift of reason, may see the truth; who not only has the oft-mentioned Gracianesque qualities of practical conduct, but also possesses the vision necessary to avail himself of virtue in the pilgrimage toward salvation; he is the elite, thus, not only of the world, but also the "elite" part of man. The name *Cratilo* (Plato's

⁶ Cf. *Falerina*, Matteo M. Boiardo, *Orlando Innamorato*, in *Opere* (Milano, 1937), 2. 84; *Falirena*, Luis Barahona de Soto, *La Angelica* (1586) (New York, 1904), 9.

⁷ "... dividido está diciendo; Di os, Di os la vida, Di os la hacienda, Di os la tierra, Di os el cielo, Di os el ser, Di os mi gracia, Di os a mi mismo, Di os lo todo, . . . de modo, que del dar, del hacernos todo bien, tomó el Señor su santísimo y augustísimo renombre de Dios en nuestra lengua española" (*Agudeza*, in *Obras*, 189).

⁸ "*Crisis* es un vocablo de naturaleza griega, de la facultad de la arte médica, que quiere decir 'juico' del verbo *crino* que es 'juzgar,'" quoted by Romera-Navarro from Antonio Liñán y Verdugo, *Guía y avisos de forasteros*, 1620 (Madrid, 1923), 215. References to the *Criticón* will be to the edition of Miguel Romera-Navarro, 3 volumes (Philadelphia, 1938/39/40). See my note 30 for a further discussion of Gracián's *crisi*.

Cratylus) probably provided a general onomastic mold for Gracián, as with a slight *trastrocar* it yields a new allusion. Its alteration on the basis of *krino*, *krítos*, gives the *correspondencia* to 'reason' and 'judgment' which the author requires.⁹

The name *Andrenio* likewise suggests its Greek origin (*anér*, *andrós*). Its form, as noted, probably emerges from both *Andrés* and *Andronio* (*Andronicus*), and in Gracián's scheme is symbolic of 'raw, untutored man.' He is Critilo's "otro yo" (I, 249), and almost any page will reveal variations on the "Andrenio," or the raw, unprincipled, carnal, ingenuous, etc., element in all men: Andrenio can be the simple one in search of wisdom (I, 258); he can be the head which is kicked about like a football: "... de hombres, digo, descabezados, más llenos de viento que de entendimiento..." (I, 257); or, as is illustrated when they approach Virtelia's palace, he can be the spontaneous and unreflective man who will not face the hardships of virtue: "¡No quiero montes! ¡Quita allá gigantes!" (I, 230).¹⁰ The name now reveals a greater dramatic and intellectual message. Gracián has created the name *Andrenio* 'man' because "man" has a particular significance in his semantics. "Man," the raw material, is distinguished regularly by the Jesuit from *persona*,

⁹ The two *Cratilos* that have come to my notice are Plato's *Cratylus*, certainly known to Gracián, and the son of the king of Bituania in the *Persiles* (*Obras completas*, [Madrid, 1946], 1763).

¹⁰ In addition: *Andrenio* is of course 'youth,' with its traditional connotation of heedlessness, in contrast to the "*sabio Critilo*," who is 'old-age': "la loca juventud" and "la vegez sabia" (III, 20); *Andrenio* is deceived by *Hipocrinda* and must be urged on by *Critilo* lest he remain with her (II, 245); he actually does stay behind with *Falsirena* 'sensuality' while *Critilo* goes on to the *Escorial* (I, 351). *Arturo Fari-nelli's* idea that the name *Andrenio* emerged from an *Ardenio* of *Alonso de Ledesma*, in his *Conceptos espirituales* (Madrid, 1600), is probably in error (ed. *El héroe, El discreto*, [Madrid, 1900], 233). *Ardenio* was a common pastoral name in the Renaissance, derived from the *Ardennes Forest*, common in the "Chansons de Geste." It appears in *Salas Barbadillo, Fiestas de la boda* (Madrid, 1622), fol. 63^r; *Lope de Vega, Laura perseguida*, in *Obras*, ed. Acad. N. (Madrid, 1916-30, VII, 110); *Ardenia*, *Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa, La constante Amarilis* (Madrid, 1781), *passim*; etc. The "forest" allusion has suffered a marked alteration in the Renaissance pastoral. Originally, the *Ardennes* was a place of dread and danger. Cf. *Charlemagne's* encounter with the frightful leopard there: "Devers Ardene vit venir un leupart, son cors deménie fierement asalt," *Chanson de Roland*, ed. T. Atkinson Jenkins (New York, 1924), 61; or the *Robledo de Corpes* in the *Cid*. The medieval forest of danger has become a forest of joy by analogy with the ancient pastoral.

or "man" under control of reason.¹¹ In the *Criticón* (I, 350) Andrenio is called "hombre o bestia." The pilgrims are sometimes addressed: "Lástima me hacéis de veros *tan hombres y tan poco personas*" (II, 104); or again, after Artemia has constructed an individual from a wooden rod who "hablaba, de modo que le podía escuchar; discurría y valía, al fin, lo que bastaba *para ser persona*" (II, 104). *Andrenio*, thus, translates Spanish *hombre* with its exact etymological meaning from rare Latin *homo* 'gross man' (see any good Latin lexicon). As Jansen points out (p. 14), *hombre* may sometimes include an additional attribute, "hombres substanciales y de fondo" (I, 245), or "hombres de veras" (*ibid.*), in which instance it becomes equivalent to *sabio*, *persona*, and the rest. But *hombre* alone cannot convey a "real human being" (*wirklicher Mensch*), and is generally equivalent to just "man" — the flesh, the instincts (see *Falsirena*) — or "animal," as noted above. The effect of the name *Andrenio*, then, is to abstract all the qualities which Gracián associates with simple "man," and to portray them onomastically in the individual who depicts them. We have seen only a fraction of the characteristics which *Andrenio* exhibits. His name is a dramatic summation of them all.

Critilo, meanwhile, is Ariel forever struggling against him, never with entire success. The name *Critilo* — 'judge,' 'rational man' — synthesizes the various Gracianesque notions of *sabio*, *héroe*, *persona*, and the rest, while the act of combining him and *Andrenio*, his "otro yo," probably reflects orthodox Christian polarized man as Critilo pursues his task of education of his baser self (*Andrenio*). In any instance, the pair highlight Gracián's dualistic concept of man. *Critilo* "higher man" is equipped with the Stoical qualities (Gracián carries on the immemorial task of attempting to reconcile pagan and Christian thought) of prudence, moderation, and impassivity, as Gracián, like Mateo Alemán, arms Christian man with extraordinary powers of 'judgment' to enable him to cope with the universal deceit around him (Baroque *desengaño*).¹² (Note 12 on page 220)

¹¹ Hellmut Jansen's *Die Grundbegriffe des Baltasar Gracián* (Genève, 1958) treats the concept of *persona* in Gracián at length, tracing the initial medieval establishment of its meaning to Boethius, thence to Aquinas, and to Covarrubias in Gracián's own day: "Persona, según los Filósofos, . . . 'est naturae rationalis individua substantia'" (see especially pp. 10–14). They of course elaborate the late Latin acceptance of 'real person,' after its original meaning of 'mask' and 'actor.' See also Hans Rheinfelder, *Das Wort "persona." Geschichte seiner Bedeutungen* (Halle, 1928).

C. *Queens and Courts, the Main Figures*

Artemia. The exterior resemblance of this name to *arte* makes it possible under the canon of "agudeza nominal" for her to personify the 'arts' or 'reason.' It should be noted that the form is one of two (with *Honoría*) that corresponds to "agudeza nominal" without a *trastrocar*; or should we say, that the *trastrocar* is entirely mental, the traditional form of the name being maintained intact. But a bold *correspondencia* is effected by supposing the name to be compounded from *arte*, especially since it had already acquired a traditional literary usage, with perhaps no allusive content except occasionally to 'virginity' (from *Artemis*).¹² *Artemia*, reminiscent of the long tradition of the Liberal Arts, will achieve miracles, as did they: she converts the "villano zafio" to "cortesano galante"; the *vizcaíno* to "eloquente secretario" (the language of Biscayans was parodied in Spain, as is well known, from Lope de Rueda, through Cervantes, to modern times); and she makes a "César de un escribano," "hombres graves" from "hombres muy livianos." This queen is a worker of prodigious deeds; and to climax her feats, she produces "un hombre que discurría" from a wooden rod (all quotations from I, 251–253). The ideal of the Liberal Arts (see Curtius, p. 42) in both Antiquity and the Middle Age as the glory of man's mind and as bequeathed by God (M.A.) lived in Gracián

¹² Cf. J. García López, *Baltasar Gracián* (Barcelona, 1947), 45–46: "Prudencia, moderación, impassibilidad, son, por sí solas, virtudes de claro abolengo estoico; pero Gracián es un hombre de su siglo; y lo prueba la presencia en sus obras de uno de los temas capitales de la moral de la época barroca: la idea del desengaño. Como Calderón y tantos otros, cree que la inteligencia, la razón y la moral filosofía conducen siempre a la virtud porque son ellas las que nos advierten la inanidad de todo lo terreno . . ."

¹³ Two saints, *Artemia* and *Artemio* (*Artemius*, d. 362), bear forms of this name. See S. Baring-Gould, *Lives of the Saints* (Edinburgh, 1914). In the Renaissance, however, the name seems to have been associated with reminiscences of *Artemis*, by way of the popular Spanish *Artemisia* and *Artemisa*. This is the message of the name in the *Seraphina* (1525), where the virgin-designation has an ironic use (Madrid, 1874, *passim*). The figure represented, an old woman of loose morals, is depicted as absolutely virtuous and virginal, but the opposite turns out to be true as the story unfolds. Socrates speculates on *Artemis*' name in the *Cratylus*: "Artemis appears to get her name from her healthy . . . and well-ordered nature, and her love of virginity; or perhaps he who named her meant that she is learned in virtue . . . or possibly, too, that she hates sexual intercourse . . . of man and woman" (London, 1953, 81).

as he used this name. *Artemia* means quite simply, then, 'reason,' and although she is once called *Saber* (I, 262), the broad symbolism of 'wisdom' is reserved for *Sofisbella*. *Artemia*, thus, synthesizes a prime motif in Gracián: she symbolizes the absolutely miraculous power of reason; she creates a man who not only *discurría* but thereupon also *valía* (I, 253). She is seen to be, of all the queens, perhaps the "queen of queens," since she represents in essence the same glorification of 'reason' and 'judgment' that is typified by Critilo.

Falimundo. The derivation of this name has already been analyzed. He is *engaño* 'deception,' and is vaguely conceived of as a monarch with a "Babilonia, que no corte" (I, 250) where Andrenio is held captive. As might be expected, there is only one defense against this evil potentate — logically *Artemia* 'reason,' who assures Critilo, playing again upon the *arte* in her name, that "... no nos ha de faltar *ardid* contra el engaño" (I, 250).

The treatment of these various allegorical names now permits us to make a generalization on them and *Falimundo*, a generalization which has been suggested in reference to Andrenio and which will apply generally to the other principal allegorical figures. It has been mentioned that sometimes specifically, sometimes only vaguely — as here, with *Falimundo* — the allegorical personages are kings, queens, and the like. It follows that rulers have courts, and that courts have courtiers and their other sundry retainers around them. Gracián has given the invented names to the monarchs of successive courts, the *primor* of the "agudeza nominal" being reserved for the chief figures who, in their position of eminence, have sway over many followers. The followers, accordingly, portray the various components of the major vice (or virtue) which is abstracted and synthesized by the fantastic ruler-appellation. We have mentioned how *Andrenio* may synthesize all qualities which Gracián associates with "man." *Deceit*, too, is a broad concept, and at the "juegos bacanales" at the "Babilonia, que no corte" of *Falimundo*, the whole throng attend: "... la vulpeja salía con máscara de cordero, la serpiente de paloma, el usurero de limosnero, ... el adúltero de amigo del marido, ..." (I, 254). The "agudeza nominal," a thing of wit and beauty, is consciously given to the main virtues and vices, to the 'crises' of man's life, while the infinite components of these virtues and vices — here courtiers — maintain everywhere

their direct names — *la Lujuria, la Codicia, la Justicia* — as personified qualities, or the unpersonified ones shown above for Falimundo. This process, we think, is of striking originality in Gracián.¹⁴ *Artemia* could have been simply *el Saber*, and was briefly so called, as we have seen. But *Artemia*, by virtue of historical reminiscence and sex (*Artemis*), is a queen, and can rule over many subjects, the components of the 'arts.' Falimundo might have been *el Engaño*, but the onomastic ending in *-mundo*, as well as its geographic connotation (see "Conclusion"), and the opportunity to Latinize the stem, proves both more *agudo*, more regal, hence more synthetic, since he can be endowed with a court — and thus more efficient intellectually and more dramatic novelistically than the direct name. In the allegorical voyage the high points and stops along the road are signaled by the *primor* of an "agudeza nominal."

Falsirena. Unlike *Falimundo*, *Falsirena* points to the traditional Spanish derivation from the participle *falsus* (Spanish *falso*) which form is dictated by the initial *s* of *sirena*, the key concept of the personage who will represent 'woman,' "False" and a "Siren." The heavy medieval reflection would be overbearing did not Gracián qualify it by saying his Siren represents "la mala muger" (I, 350). The functions of the Sirens in Homer are of course commonplaces of Western literature and, as such, make available to Gracián a wealth of images with which to express his Christian sensuality, his "mundo, demonio, carne" (I, 351). The Sirens appear, first, with their sisters, the "furias, parcas, . . . arpías . . ." (I, 351). *Falsirena*'s palace coalesces with Circe's pigsty, where Andrenio is discovered on the ground with other victims. In short, a series of traditional antique pictures is evoked by the name *Falsirena* to personify Gracián's Christian distrust of the flesh; and we are again reminded of the reconciliation, or attempted reconciliation, which had been going

¹⁴ In the cousin "novel" to the *Criticón*, Bunyan's *Pilgrim's progress* (1677), the qualities of men parade unadorned: *Obstinate, Pliable, Christian, Worldly Wisdom*, who dwells in *Carnal Policy* (London, 1928), etc. The *autos* of Calderón use similar direct appellation, with less pin-pointing of small qualities and larger conceptualization: *Amor, Pureza, Sencillez* in *Psiquis y Cupido; Esperanza, Caridad, and Fe*, the "Theological Virtues," in *Nuevo hospicio de pobres. Autos Sacramentales* (Madrid, 1759), I. Tirso follows a like pattern in his *autos*: in the *Colmenero divino, el Cuerpo, el Placer, el Mundo* (the same symbolization, essentially, as Gracián's *Falimundo*), etc.; in *Los hermanos parecidos, Admiración, Engaño, Temor, Envidia, Justicia*, etc. *Obras dramáticas completas*, ed. Blanca de los Ríos (Madrid, 1946), I, 5, 1580, *resp.*

on since the early Middle Ages, of the Antique and Christian imagination. Most of these allegorical personages — principals, as noted, on the pilgrimage — do not appear again once they have been seen (except *Felisinda* 'happiness,' who will draw the pilgrims on throughout the novel); but *Falsirena*, long after her principal action, almost at the end of the voyage (III, 411), is recalled as having been a necessary test on the road to virtue: "... el escarmiento en la casa de *Falsirena*."¹⁵

Felisinda. There are numerous names fashioned on *felix*, *-icis*.¹⁶ The meaning of the root, 'joyous,' defines her mission in the *Criticón* as both doctrinal 'happiness' and as the amorous object of Critilo and Andrenio. Like *Falimundo*, *Falsirena*, and others, she exhibits a compound name, *Felis-inda*, which combines both 'joyous' and the common onomastic suffix *-inda*, as in *Lucinda*. But the *correspondencias* are more ample in "agudeza nominal." It is probably hardly accidental that "happiness" emerges from and is constantly recalled by the reader as having been associated with remote India, nor that this allegorical personification of happiness should have a name terminating with *-inda*, which is not only suffix but directly relevant to 'India.'¹⁷ *Felisinda* might thus have a message of

¹⁵ *Sirena*, to be sure, need not necessarily be a configuration of vice; elsewhere it may suggest simple feminine allure: e.g. Tirso, *El pretendiente al revés* and *Celos con celos se curan* (*Obras*, II, 230, 1333, *resp.*). Gracián's use of the name stems substantially from the medieval systems of allegory which attempted to reconcile pagan mythology to the Christian order: "Circe es aquella pasión natural que llaman amor deshonesto, que las más veces transforma a los más sabios y de mayor juicio en animales fieros y llenos de furor . . . Por Ulises se entiende la parte de nuestra ánima que participa de la razón [since he defied Circe and the Sirens] . . ." Juan Pérez de Moya, *Philosophia Secreta* (Madrid, 1928), 219.

¹⁶ Variations, also with *s*, are: *Felisso*, José Camerino, *Novelas amorosas*, ed. Fernando Gutiérrez (Barcelona, 1955), 59; *Felesindos*, Alonso Núñez de Reinoso, *Amores de Clareo y Floriseo* (apud Romera-Navarro, *Criticón*, I, 157, note). Cf. Tirso's *Lisida* from Vergil's *Lycidas*, *Los cigarrales de Toledo* (Madrid, 1624), 67. With the etymological *x* and *c*, however, are the following: *Felices*, a picaresque appellation in Gonzalo Céspedes y Meneses, *El Soldado Pindaro*, ed. E. Cotarelo y Mori (Madrid, 1906), 319; *Flora Felix* in the *Persiles* (*Obras*, p. 1657); *Felixmarte* in the *Quijote* (*Obras*, p. 1158); and, of course, innumerable *Felicias* (already used in Rome), *Felicianas* (masc. and fem.), etc. The forms with the non-etymological *s* are perhaps constructed by analogy with such forms as the Germanic *Rudesindo*, *Hormesinda* (*Armesinda* in Castillo Solórzano, *La quinta de Laura*, [Madrid, 1732], 86).

¹⁷ Romera-Navarro, I, 157, note. Cf. Adolph Coster: "Jeu de mots sur Felix Inda?," "Baltasar Gracián," *Revue Hispanique*, 29 (1913), 520, note.

'happiness in India,' or 'happiness remote and inaccessible,' since this is precisely the quality she personifies, the unattainability of happiness on earth to Christian man.¹⁸

— En vano, ¡ o peregrinos del mundo, pasajeros de la vida! os cansáis en buscar desde la cuna a la tumba esta vuestra imaginada Felisinda, que el uno llama esposa, el otro madre: ya murió para el mundo y vive para el cielo. Hallarla heis allá, si la supiérades merecer en la tierra (III, 294).

The name *Felisinda* thus compliments in onomastic terms the doctrinal material cited above, even though, like Artemia, her name might occur as an ordinary feminine denomination. (See *Felesindos* below.) A semi-amorous and novelistic slant is given to the sermon by this love-quest after *Felisinda*, but its connection with the doctrinal matter is obvious. At the court of Hipocrinda, where of course the "lovers" seek Felisinda out, they must leave empty-handed, since certainly "la verdadera felicidad" (II, 246) is not to be found there, but only at the implied end of the pilgrimage, death, and the contemplation of the divine.

Hipocrinda, Virtelia: These two queens are treated together since they are closely associated in the text.

Hipocrinda represents 'hypocrisy,' and will be best explained here in her function as "queen vice" (see Falimundo, and the attendant explanation of the system of "vice-monarchs"), the queen in whose court pullulate *la Simonía, la Usura, el Festejo* (II, 232), specific "hypocrisies," and especially the "falso hermitaño y verdadero embustero," commonplace for religious hypocrisy.¹⁹ The function of queen for a prime vice has been efficacious up to this point, but as we reach "hypocrisy" Gracián finds it expedient to consider her also as the Mother Superior of a convent (II, 233), since the first hypocrisy to our Jesuit is the religious one. Thus the abstraction of *Hipocrinda* "rules" over an additional series of specific hypocrites: the false hermit, a false priest, a gluttonous priest, false alcalde, and finally, a *professo*, who "más . . . huele a ladrón que a monge" (II,

¹⁸ The orient, then and now, was a commonplace for "vast distance away." Well known are the misgivings about Columbus' sailing to India, that he might fall off the edge of the world, etc.

¹⁹ See Romera-Navarro, II, 228, note.

234), all these being concretions of the major vice typified by Hipocrinda. In the religious and moral sphere, however, the aim of hypocrisy is the cloak of *virtue*, and our "falso hermitaño" will accordingly stand athwart the path and urge the pilgrims away from one who is designated "alma de la alma, vida de la vida . . . realce de todas las prendas, corona de las perfecciones, y perfección de todo el ser" (II, 225), Queen Virtelia.

The regal personification, as well as the suggestion of the devoted search (" . . . donde quiera que se halla es hermosa, y por eso tan estimada" II, 225), is maintained in her. *Virtelia* 'virtue,' however, is perhaps the queen most pregnant with allegorical possibilities: the path to her palace is an ascent, symbolical of the vices and also of the trials to be endured in achieving virtue: "Vamos . . . en busca de aquella flor de reinas, la hermosa Virtelia, que nos dizen mora aquí en lo alto de un monte, en los confines del cielo . . ." (II, 229). Such a goal is reminiscent of either the Christian pilgrim through life, or the knight errant. *Virtelia* must have a guide to her palace, as *Hipocrinda* did to hers; and this guide is, logically, *Lucindo*, a name — like *Artemia* — of a traditional form, given here with a new *correspondencia*, "light," or "varón de luces," who, as a counterpart for wisdom, will 'light' the way to virtue (II, 300). Moreover, *Virtelia* has the most peopled court of all the characters: *la Sabiduría*, *la Paciencia*, *la Justicia*, *la Equidad*, *la Castidad*, *la Honestidad*, *la Sagacidad*, "gran ministra de *Virtelia*" (II, 315), all these are "virtue," and all are courtiers to Queen *Virtelia*. Finally, *Virtelia* is a "queen judge." Reminiscent of Solomon or Portia, she sits on a throne of justice (*la Justicia* is a handmaiden of hers, as noted) and answers pleas for boons: e.g., she gives courage to the soldier; skill to the priest in praying, to the farmer in planting, etc. The *agudeza Virtelia* stands as a beacon mark on man's pilgrimage through life, while all attendant "virtues" throng around her to explain what virtue is to the *vulgus*.²⁰

²⁰ It is tempting to relate the deliberateness of this homiletic method, the statement of the main thesis by an *agudeza*, and the subsequent expansion and clarification of the thesis by unaltered personified nouns (*la Lujuria*, etc.), to Gracián's inheritance from Loyola and Jesuit educational procedures. For a long discourse on Gracián, the moral teacher, after Loyola, see Andrés Rouveyre, *El español Baltasar Gracián y Federico Nietzsche*, trans. Ángel Dumarega (Madrid, n. d.), pp. 33–35, 105–125. The markedly Stoical cast of most of the "virtues" in attendance around

Honoría. As the reader knows, an *Honorius* was a Roman emperor of the West (A.D. 395–423) and an *Honoría* the licentious daughter of Valentinian who refused marriage with Attila the Hun. Many others doubtless exist, and the name is of such common stuff, both in ancient and modern times, that the measure of innovation in Gracián is small.²¹ The fact of her regal personification is supplemented by the attendant appearance of the celebrated and feared Momus, whose presence here will take us again into the ancient world as well as into the well-known seventeenth century conception of honor. For Honoría is represented as dwelling in a palace of glass, so that we are here reminded of the “honor play” and of Lope and Calderón.²² The Roman deity was styled *Honos* or *Honor*, but Gracián creates a feminine deity with deliberate effect. As a woman, she will serve several functions impossible to an allegorizing *Honor*. On the one hand, since it is Gracián’s intention to disclose that there is *no* honor left in the world, Momus will step forward and say that, since Honoría is a woman, it is doubtful that she really represents what her name designates: “Muger y buena, y en esta era? Yo lo dudo. Yo las conozco a todas . . . y no hallo cosa buena . . .” (II, 332). An additional classical reference will now be to regard Honoría as the mother of an “honorable” son, Pedro Pablo Zapata, the former governor of Aragón, whose exile signifies the departure of all “honor” from life (II, 236). Many deities might be suggested as models of this mother and son, but Aphrodite and Eros, the son gaining his qualities from his mother, is the likely inspiration for Honoría and Zapata. The conclusion here is that the only “Honoría”

Virtelia, plus the absence of those much to be desired “theological” virtues — faith, hope, and charity — may have influenced Gracián’s ecclesiastical superiors to discipline our author after the publication of the *Criticón*. Cf. Azorín, *Lecturas españolas* (Edinburgh, n.d.), 104.

“Virtues” are of course plentiful in the *autos*: *la Justicia, el Amor, la Pureza, la Sencillez, la Sabiduría, la Razón*, etc., but *no la Virtud* appears anywhere in Tirso or Calderón. Indeed, the *Criticón* has something of the aspect of a prose *auto*, the abstractions of Calderón rarified even further in such as *Virtelia*: “En realidad, la estructura técnica de *El Criticón* parece la de un auto sacramental, sin necesidad de recordar . . . las piezas de colegio, que quizá hubiese representado alguna vez el mismo Gracián.” José Manuel Blecua, *El estilo de “El Criticón”* (Zaragoza, 1945), 15.

²¹ There is an *Honorio*, a *godo*, in *La virgen de Guadalupe*, attributed to Cervantes (*Obras*, p. 1869), here associated with Alaric, Theodored, and other famous Gothic names.

²² Peribáñez styles honor *vidrio* or *caña* in the famous play of the same name.

possible is attainable in books and libraries, in the typical Stoic notion that the only personal integrity possible is in wisdom and in freedom from human passion. That *Honoría*, like *Felisinda*, eludes man's search, is a seeming reference to a contemporary earthly state, the seventeenth century in Spain, and not, as in *Felisinda*, a description of the divine plan.

Sofisbella. Gracián again seeks out the Greek lexicon to fashion the name of the queen who will personify 'wisdom.' The whole name combines the Greek *soph-* with a special form of *Isabel*, Gracián, like many writers of his time, transforming the Spanish *-bel* to the Italian *-bella*, to produce the Spanish sense of 'beautiful,' thus 'wisdom beautiful.'²³ Each queen discussed so far has represented a maximum vice or virtue in the Christian's pilgrimage on earth; *Sofisbella* does the same: "Venimos . . . en busca de una reina que si por gran dicha la topamos, nos han asegurado que con ella hallaremos quanto bien se puede desear. Y aun dezía uno que todos los bienes le havían entrado a la par con ella" (II, 104).²⁴ What with *Critilo*, the 'critic,' and *Artemia*, the 'arts,' *Sofisbella*, 'glorious wisdom,' is a sort of culmination of the others. We now have reached, in a sense, the highest plane of earthly attainment, with only *Vegecia*, 'old-age,' ahead of us, and even she, of course, will offer — as her greatest boon — wisdom (see below). It is, then, crucial that *Sofisbella*, like *Felisinda* and *Honoría*, be beyond man's reach in this bitterest of all worlds; she dwells only, finally, in that sacred precinct, the library, "tesoro de la memoria . . . no hay gusto como el leer, ni centro como una selecta librería" (II, 165–166). The absence of *Sofisbella* climaxes the bitter scene: ". . . se huyó al cielo con las demás virtudes, en aquella fuga general de *Astrea*" — indeed, she had once left her gift in the mind of a few "sabios, mas aun esos se acabaron" (II, 200).

²³ The transformation of *Isabel* to *Isbella*, to introduce an ending suggestive of 'beautiful,' was a popular device and occurs in the following: Alonso de Castillo Solórzano, *Jornadas alegres* (Madrid, 1909), 331; Tirso de Molina, *Los cigarrales de Toledo* (Madrid, 1624), 73; Pedro de Castro y Anaya, *Las auroras de Diana* (Coimbra, 1654), 231. A further alteration is *Isbela*, in Baltasar Altamirano, *La firmeza en los imposibles* (Zaragoza, 1646), *passim*.

²⁴ Romera-Navarro lists two traditional sources for this: *Book of Wisdom*, VII, 7 and 11: ". . . et venit in me spiritus sapientiae . . . venerunt autem mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa." Also Horace, *Epistles*, I, 1: "Ad summam, sapiens uno minor es praecipue sanus" (II, 104, note).

Vegecia. The important fact regarding *Vegecia* is not so much that her name suggests the Roman writer *Vegetius* (Spanish *Vegecio*),²⁵ although this is generally a necessary attribute of the invented name, but that she is thereupon coupled with *Janus*, the Roman deity of the two doors. Through these doors will pass the two possibilities of man — those typified by *Andrenio* and *Critilo* — one through the door of *horrores*, or just the decrepitude of old age, and the other, *Critilo*, through the door of *honores*, or the wisdom accessible to some in old age (III, 24–25). The name *Vegecia*, unproductive of any allusion beyond the exterior resemblance to *vejez*, in addition to the reminiscence of *Vegetius*, must perforce be combined with *Janus*, so that Gracián, when necessary, can conceive of a variation on his *agudeza nominal*, namely, the creation of a sort of *Vegecia-Jano*, the original *agudeza* expanded with an additional antique name to fulfill the allegorical picture which the author seeks.²⁶ Queen *Vegecia*, the *honores* part of her, commands a large retinue, the qualities of whom she keynotes and synthesizes, in the Gracianesque technique we have described: *La Cordura, la Autoridad, el reposo* (the uncapitalized names are no different in allegorical function than those capitalized), *el asiento, la madurez, la prudencia, la gravedad, la entereza* (III, 45).

²⁵ Among all the Roman writers who are frequently mentioned by Renaissance authors, the famous author of the military tract appears comparatively little. Quevedo uses his name to mock the pretensions of the cultists: "Si se ofreciere decir: 'No vengo apercebida,' dirá: 'Vengo inerme'; y encomiéndose a Vegecio." *La cultura latiniparla*, in *Obras en prosa*, ed. Luis Astrana Marín (Madrid, 1941), 788.

²⁶ Rather than any suggestion of 'prudence' (Romera-Navarro, III, 24, note), Gracián uses the image in its original antique symbolism of "God of the Two Gates," this picture affording him, with its connotation of youth and age, the allegory of old-age which he seeks, its *horrores* and *honores*, and the respective places of *Andrenio* and *Critilo* in them: "... distantes por ser una la puerta de los honores y la otra de los horrores . . ." (III, 32). *Janua* 'doorway, arch, way.' Baltasar de Vitoria similarly rejects a moralistic interpretation of the god: "Deste pintura [depicting the god as deity of coinage because of his two-fold nature] han tratado muchos autores, trayendo infinidad de moralidades; yo como me he resuelto a no traer ninguna en este libro, las dexo para los Mitológicos, que hazen juicio a montón, y se hartan de predicar" (I, 9). For an additional employment of the God cf. "... E tanto pacificó el mundo de males, que tovo cerrado las puertas de Jano." Juan de Mena, *Laberinto de fortuna* (Madrid, 1951), 112, and note of the Brocense: "... cuyas puertas, si estaban abiertas era señal que había guerras y si estaban cerradas avía paz."

D. Minor Allegorical Figures

Wherever convenient, Gracián turns also to name conceits for his minor characters. We have already mentioned *Lucindo* as the "varón de luces," symbol of wisdom and guide to *Virtelia*.²⁷ There is also an *Egenio* (Latin *egenus* 'deserving, needing'), whose name is qualified by Gracián: "... este era su nombre, ya definición" (I, 366).²⁸ He is thus named because he has a sixth sense, considering that "necessity" "... es ingeniosa, inventiva...", or as English has it, the "mother of invention" comprises a sense additional to the usual five.²⁹ *Volusia* (from the Roman jurist *Volusius*, in preference to the popular *Volupia* or *voluptas*) 'sensuality' compliments the functions of *Falsirena* (I, 320).

The majority of the minor inventions are dedicated, however, to a favorite antipathy of the severe Jesuit: to the *Buena Miel*, as he styles the individual lacking in self-assertion and independence. There are a variety of these characters: a *Pachorra* 'phlegm, indolence,' whose very lethargy prevents the exercise of self-assertion; *Don Fulano de Macapán* 'Sir Candy' or 'Sir Creampuff'; *Buenas Entrañas*, *Canónigo Blandura*,³⁰ *Dexado*, "y bien dexado de todos"; similarly, *Juan de Buen Alma*, *Boncampañó*, *Buen Hombre*, *Hombre de su Palabra* (all from III, 184–186). The very number of these

²⁷ It is interesting to note the alteration of the traditional as Gracián seeks new *correspondencias*. *Lucinda*, or *Luscinda*, as in the *Quijote*, proceeds also from *lux*, *lucis* (similarly, *Lucela*, *Lucenda*, *Lucendra*, *Lucerino*, *Lucino*, *Luzimena*, etc.), but refers to the radiance and light of physical beauty. Radiance and light for the Jesuit, however, belong to another province, to the mind and spirit. Perceivable again are the antique and medieval reminiscences. Another guide of the period takes his name from *lux*, *lucis*: *don Lucido* (*Luzido*) guides a resurrected Menippus through an insane asylum on the moon; each *lunático* they visit is a different type of poet; the name here suggests not only the function of the guide, but reveals that he is the only sane one on the moon. See Anastasio Pantaleón de Rivera, "Vexamen que el poeta dió en la Insigne Academia de Madrid," in *Obras* (1631) (Madrid, 1670), fol. 87^vf.

²⁸ This is the name Curtius uses to trace the stylistic device of allusive names from Homer to "Spanish Mannerism" (p. 500).

²⁹ See Romera-Navarro (I, 366, note) for a similar idea in Italian. Gracián, however, attributes the notion to his friend Miguel Dicastillo, author of the *Aula de Dios* (Zaragoza, 1637): "A la necesidad, apodó un sexto sentido" (*Agudeza*, in *Obras*, 234).

³⁰ Referring to Manuel de Salinas, former friend of Gracián, according to Romera-Navarro (III, 186, note; wherein, in the *Discreto*, he is depicted as constantly saying: "assí es; es tan cierto esso," etc.).

names verifies the Jesuit's particularly violent scorn for the soft and the passive, and these personal traits can doubtless be grouped with those that Gracián feels impede the exercise of judgment and criterion.

Various other evils are also onomastically portrayed: a *Buñuelo de Viento* is a windy preacher; treacherous and false qualities are represented by *Raposo* and *Tracillas*, and a *Duque de Bernardina*.³¹ *Marrajo* 'uncouth' is considered by Romera-Navarro to refer again to Salinas,³² and an *Infanta doña Toda* is reduced by Gracián to *doña Nada* in a mockery of the pretension of lineage.

Clearly, the *primores* of the "agudeza nominal" are reserved in general for very special figures, the few unimportant ones above to the contrary notwithstanding. This is a process which we have already commented on and which we will summarize now.

E. Summary, the Sermon

Since it is clear that the invented names are given to the principal allegorical personages, let us see, briefly, the system we may extract from them. *Critilo* and *Andrenio* are of course *Man*; and *Man*, not a eulogy of reason or a critique of the world's evil, is the subject of the *Criticón*.³³ More than *Man*, indeed, the conduct of Christian

³¹ Inspired by the expression, "decir bernardinas": "Bernardinas son unas razones que ni atan ni desatan, y no significando nada. Pretende el que las dize, con su disimulación, engañar a los que le están oyendo. Pienso tuvo su origen de algún mentecato llamado Bernardino, que razonando decía muchas cosas sin que una se atase con otra." Sebastián de Covarrubias y Horozco, *Tesoro de la lengua castellana* (Barcelona, 1943). A possible source of the expression is from "*Bernart*, nombre del asno en *Le Roman de Renart*." Joan Corominas, *Diccionario etimológico crítico de la lengua española* (Mexico, 1948).

³² Probably clear proof that Gracián felt strongly against Salinas, if it refers to him, since *marrajo* is an emphatic word: Quevedo, "El padre, que era marrajo . . .", referring to a well-known lout in the *Cuento de cuentos* (*op. cit.*, 794). Castillo Solórzano, ". . . el marrajo y mal hermitaño . . .", *La guardaña de Sevilla*, *BAE*, 33.217.

³³ See Otis H. Green, "On the Meaning of 'Crisi(s)' before the *Criticón*," *Hispanic Review*, 21 (1953), 218-220. In addition to *Criticón* 'Libro de críticas,' bearing in mind the almost negligible possibility that Gracián intends but one nuance in a word of this importance, it may be suggested that *criticón* and *crisi* also expound man's search for virtue through truth, and emphasize the demands of the spirit against the flesh: "So wie ja auch die Abschnitte des "*Criticón*" in "*Crisis*" zerfallen, d.h. in Erlebnisse, aus denen moralische Entscheidungen entspringen müssen." Werner Krauss, *Gracián's Lebenslehre* (Frankfurt a.M., 1947), 38. Gracián's *crisi*, thus, 'moral crisis.'

man is the subject of the novel. The *Criticón*, then, in all senses of the word, is a grave sermon, albeit with a special emphasis on worldly and profane activity; a definition of what man's nature is, *Critilo* and *Andrenio*, and what his actions should be in this most evil of all worlds.³⁴

But man must dwell briefly on earth. This fact is symbolized by the presence of *Falimundo*, who is emblematic not just of the 'falseness of the world,' or the 'world of the false,' but *of* the world. The world is of course "false" to the believing Christian. *Falimundo* will personify, with *Falsirena*, the emptiness of corporeal existence. *Falsirena* has a somewhat complex function, but her basic nature is a shallow disguise for "life itself." Gracián, to be sure, embellishes his sermon with varied tales of temptation and lust, as we have seen, in the pictures drawn from the remote Sirens and Circe. But the end product is a *Falsirena*, partly, to be sure, in the Medieval sense, signifying the female corruption of man, but more important, a *Falsirena* who is corporeal existence itself, "mundo, demonio, carne," in Gracián's own words (I, 351).

If, then, the names noted depict man and his state in the world, there stands the "flower" of Queens, *Virtelia*, opposed to them. Up to this point we have, in a sense, treated what we may call the negative aspects of man's passage on earth. Is there no positive element to man's life? There is only one, says Gracián, virtue. Virtue, as

³⁴ The writer of this article is aware of the long history of argument over the orthodoxy, or the lack of it, in Gracián's treatment of Christian morality: the controversy extends from Gracián's ecclesiastical contemporaries (see note 17) to Karl Vossler in this century. Critics have pointed out the absence of religious considerations in the novel, and stressed its conclusion in the "pagan" area of worldly fame rather than in the lap of salvation. On the one hand, there are those who accept the orthodoxy of the Jesuit and point out the needlessness of his insisting on dogmatic truths which were accepted by all (see esp. Romera-Navarro, "Sobre la moral de Gracián," *Hispanic Review*, 3 (1935), 119-126). At the opposite pole is Karl Vossler, who asserts: ". . . los males de la vida son [for Gracián], más bien que un problema filosófico, un tema literario, y los abusos de su pueblo y sociedad son, más bien que un objeto y asunto de reforma, una muy bien venida ocasión de esparcir sales, conceptos y parábolas . . ." "Los motivos satíricos en la literatura del Siglo de Oro," *Cruz y Raya*, 8 (1933), 20. Both the underlying Christian morality and the high didactic purpose are demonstrated, it is hoped, by this study, which would support Werner Krauss in his contention that ". . . es rein unmöglich [ist] sein moralisierendes Grundanliegen in den Wind zu schlagen und als bloße Verbrämung des spielerischen Kunsttriebs abzutun" (*op. cit.*, 36).

we have said, is a complex concept, so that the components thereof — including even such daring concepts as the famous “*santa astucia*” — as if a homiletic explanation from the pulpit, teem through her court. *Virtelia* ‘virtue’ is a real and attainable end for man, but instead he seeks *Felisinda* ‘joy’ (*Critilo*, too), in his weak flesh, but of course in vain. As noted, she spans the novel, giving it movement forward until *Vegecia* ‘old age’ is reached. *Vegecia* is crucial since she symbolizes man’s last and best chance for wisdom, after “*la loca juventud*” has passed. The place of reason and wisdom has been amply discussed here. *Artemia* and *Sofisbella* are at once a doubling of the emphasis on this imperative demand and a distinct reflection of the medieval preoccupation with *scientia* and *sapientia* (cf. Augustine’s lengthy researches on them; see Curtius, p. 40), and again attest the Jesuit’s respect for the stoic’s stand, even while neither queen is to be found on earth.

Honoría and *Hipocrinda* remain for our consideration. The absence of the first, with the bitter acknowledgment of the second, allows an intense sense of contemporary satire to enter this otherwise profoundly doctrinal work: *Honoría*, for her reflection of the Spanish preoccupation with *pundonor*; *Hipocrinda*, because she reflects the contemporary obsession with universal hypocrisy, the leitmotif of *Guzmán de Alfarache*, and a favorite subject for satire in Gracián’s day.

A very clear conclusion to our discussion may now be stated. Gracián has availed himself of the *primor* of the “*agudeza nominal*” to symbolize man and his main concerns on earth. His invented names have highlighted the main aspects of the moral message and have offered us an onomastic passage through the nature of man and his moral life itself.

Thus the didactic nature of the *Criticón* is clear. The preacher’s art is to give life to his sermon. The invented names we have discussed make the allegorical personifications more outright personal, and thus are more easily absorbed by the reader; they are more vividly representative of the qualities personified (cf. *la Hipocresía* for ‘hypocrisy,’ as the contemporary writer of the *auto* would have said, in contrast to Gracián’s *Hipocrinda*); and are more likely to be

remembered in the course of the novel.³⁵ In the *Criticón* the author seeks by literary means to reach his congregation with the maximum impress possible. In Gracián, thus, as perhaps nowhere else, the intellectual exercise of conceptism attains a fine synthesis of aesthetic ideal and moral purpose. The demonstration that the whole of man and his moral 'crises' can be signalized by a series of invented allegorical names reveals the originality of Gracián's technique and the efficacy with which he practiced his own doctrine of "Agudeza nominal."

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³⁵ Cf. Leo Spitzer, "'Betlengabor' — Une Erreur de Gracián?", *RFE*, 17 (1930), 179: "L' 'appellativisation' des noms propres rentre tout à fait dans les habitudes stylistiques de Gracián, qui aime à donner une nouvelle âme sémantique aux mots, à leur insuffler pour ainsi dire une nouvelle âme sémantique . . . le nom propre ne doit pas seulement avoir, chez Gracián, la fonction de dénommer un être, mais aussi de le dépeindre et caractériser."